International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral Enforcement by Magnuson, William
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-2013 
International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral Enforcement 
William Magnuson 
Texas A&M University School of Law, magnuson@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral Enforcement, 51 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 
360 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/760 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 




This Article explores how unilateral action to regulate
international corporate bribery can serve as a partial
substitute for multilateral action. The standard ac-
count generally assumes that domestic efforts to com-
bat international corporate bribery disadvantage do-
mestic corporations and create a structural
impediment to broader multilateral cooperation. This
model, however, underestimates the extent to which
states can and do regulate international corporate
bribery through unilateral action, and in particular,
through the enforcement of domestic laws against for-
eign actors. This Article argues that the extraterr-
itorial enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA) has created a strong incentive for foreign
corporations to comply with anti-bribery norms and
that this development mitigates many of the concerns
on which corruption theorists have focused. The Arti-
cle concludes that extraterritorial enforcement of the
FCPA provides a powerful motivation for other coun-
tries to cooperate in international corruption efforts
but that this unilateral enforcement may raise differ-
ent and equally problematic concerns.
* Climenko Fellow & Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to
thank Jack Goldsmith, Bill Alford, Gabriella Blurn, Beth Simmons, Matthew Stephenson,
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The way I answer the corruption charge is this: in the
last 30 years, we have implemented a development
program that was approximately $400 billion worth.
You could not have done all of that for less than $350
billion. Now, if you tell me that building this whole
country and spending $350 billion out of $400 billion,
that we had misused or gotten corrupted with $50 bil-
lion, I'll tell you, "Yes." But I'll take that any time
... . We did not invent corruption. This has hap-
pened since Adam and Eve .... This is human na-
ture.
- Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Former Saudi
Ambassador to the United States 1
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, a disaffected employee of BAE Systems, the British
arms contractor, notified United Kingdom prosecutors that BAE was
bribing Saudi Arabian officials in order to win lucrative arms deals. 2
The employee alleged that BAE, Europe's largest arms company,
maintained a massive slush fund to pay off senior Saudi officials.
Two years later, U.K. prosecutors finally began to investigate the al-
legations after the Guardian reported that the Defense Ministry had
covered up the corruption. When the investigation began to pick up
steam, however, Saudi Arabia delivered an ultimatum to the U.K.:
either drop the investigation within ten days or Saudi Arabia would
cut off the flow of counter-terrorism intelligence to Britain and deliv-
er a £10 billion fighter jet contract to France rather than the U.K. 3
Thirteen days later, the U.K. announced that it would terminate the
investigation, citing unspecified "security and foreign policy inter-
ests." 4
The case did not end there, however. A few months later, the
United States Department of Justice announced that it had launched
1. Frontline, Black Money, Apr. 7, 2009 (PBS television broadcast Apr. 7, 2009, at
52:25) (quoting an earlier Frontline interview from 2001).
2. See David Leigh & Rob Evans, MoD Chief in Fraud Cover-Up Rowt, GUARDIAN,
Oct. 13, 2003, at 1.
3. See Christopher Hope, Halt Inquiry Or We Cancel Euro/ighters, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 1, 2006, at 1.
4. Clare Dyer, BAE Enquiry: Attorney General: Clash of Interests Highlighted by
Decision to Halt Investigation, GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2006, at 7.
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its own investigation into corruption at BAE. 5 The U.S. investigation
would eventually uncover one of the largest and most extensive brib-
ery schemes in history: BAE had been lavishing Saudi princes and
their families with private jets, luxury cars, exotic holidays and hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in return for a multi-billion dollar fighter
jet contract. 6 BAE paid a record $400 million fine to the United
States to resolve allegations of wrongdoing. 7
The BAE affair would appear to represent a success in the in-
ternational effort to combat corporate bribery. After reports came out
that a large corporation was paying huge bribes to foreign officials in
return for business, and despite one investigation being shelved due
to political pressure, a full investigation of the corruption was
launched and the corporation was held criminally liable. But what is
most striking about the BAE affair is not that BAE was held liable,
but who held them liable, and for what. It was not BAE's home
country, Britain; and neither was it the country whose officials re-
ceived the bribes, Saudi Arabia, that held BAE to account. It was a
third country, the United States, holding it liable for violations of
U.S. law. This curious situation raises a number of interrelated ques-
tions. Why should the United States be concerned about wrongdoing
by non-U.S. nationals outside of U.S. borders? When can U.S. laws
apply to non-citizens operating abroad? What sort of consequences
does U.S. enforcement of domestic law outside its borders entail?
And what effects does such enforcement have on the incentives of
other countries to enforce anti-corruption norms against their own
corporations? 8
5. Julia Werdigier, U.S. Starts Inquiry Into British Arms Contractor, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., June 27, 2007, at 6.
6. Prince Bandar bin Sultan alone received hundreds of millions. See George Jones,
Blair Fends Off Row "To Press Ibr Saudi Deal", DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 9, 2007, at 6;
Michael Robinson, BBC Lifts the Lid on Secret BAE Slush Fund, BBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2004,
1:39 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3712770.stn.
7. It should be noted that BAE was not convicted of FCPA violations. BAE
ultimately pled guilty to a number of other charges, including conspiring to defraud the
United States and to make false statements to the U.S. government. It is, however, generally
considered an FCPA case, given the nature of the allegations. See Sheannan & Sterling
LLP, FCPA Digest: Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Jan. 2011), http://www.shearman.com/
files/upload/FCPA-Digest-Jan-201 1.pdf.
8. The Supreme Court has recently been struggling with similar questions in other
issue areas, including securities regulation and human rights. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (examining the extraterritorial application of the
Securities Act); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 132 S.Ct. 248 (2011) (examining the extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort
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This Article addresses the problem of political corruption, by
which I mean the abuse of public office for private gain. The para-
digmatic example of political corruption is quid pro quo bribery,
where a person pays money to a government official in return for
special treatment, such as a promise of government contracts or low-
er tax rates. Political corruption can be deeply harmful to society, as
it distorts government decision-making, 9 delegitimizes political insti-
tutions, 10 reduces administrative efficiency 11 and slows economic
growth. 12 International corruption, that is, the bribery of government
officials by corporations from other countries, presents potentially
even more problematic issues for states. 13
Section I outlines a theoretical framework for understanding
the structural impediments that corporate bribery regulation must
overcome. This section develops a model to analyze the effect of
domestic anti-corruption laws on the incentives of domestic and for-
eign companies with regard to bribery. The model predicts that do-
mestic prohibitions on international bribery may decrease the payoffs
from bribery to a sufficient extent that bribery is no longer in the in-
terests of corporations, but that unilateral action by one country
against its own corporations may be counterproductive, steering in-
ternational business to foreign competitors and making international
cooperation more difficult, not less. This theory suggests that effec-
tive international corruption regulation must reduce the payoffs from
Statute).
9. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS AND
A PLAN TO STOP IT 226-47 (2011) (describing the effects of corruption on legislative
decision-making); Paulo Mauro, Corruption and the Composition of Government
Expenditure, 69 J. PUB. EcON. 263 (1998) (finding that corruption alters the composition of
government expenditure, and in particular that it reduces government spending on
education). But see FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE
INTEGRITY: How CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE 174 85 (1996)
(arguing that prosecutions of government corruption may not create a net benefit for the
public).
10. See Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 417, 422 (1967) (arguing that "[b]y destroying the
legitimacy of political structures in the eyes of those who have power to do something about
the situation, corruption can contribute to instability and possible national disintegration");
Susan Rose-Ackenran, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 45 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997).
11. See Gerald E. Caiden & Naomi J. Caiden, Administrative Corruption, 37 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 301 (1977) (describing the effects of corruption on administrative efficiency).
12. See Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Groith, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681 (1995) (finding
that corruption lowers private investment and thereby reduces economic growth).
13. See in/ra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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bribery to all relevant corporations, not some subset of them.
Section II presents the standard account of the United States's
international anti-corruption law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977 (FCPA), which prohibits companies from making payments
to foreign officials in return for business. The predominant view
among corruption scholars has been that international corporate brib-
ery presents a prisoners' dilemma and that the FCPA represents a
kind of unilateral disarmament by the U.S. government. According
to this model, the FCPA imposed competitive constraints on U.S.
corporations that were not imposed on non-U.S. corporations. The
enactment of the FCPA, thus, led to sharp criticism from local busi-
nesses, but it also changed the incentives of domestic actors. U.S.
corporations that faced the threat of an unequal playing field-they
couldn't bribe foreign officials for contracts, but their competitors
could-lobbied, not just for revocation of the FCPA, but also in the
alternative for a comprehensive international agreement regulating
foreign corruption. 14 This domestic pressure, the story goes, led to
the conclusion of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997.15 The
Anti-Bribery Convention, however, did not alter the fundamental na-
ture of the international corporate bribery game, and foreign govern-
ments have failed to enforce their anti-bribery laws in a rigorous
manner. 16 Thus, U.S. companies still face the same competitive dis-
advantages that they did before the international agreement.
Section III argues that the standard account of international
corporate bribery fundamentally misunderstands the nature and effect
of the FCPA on international business transactions. While the FCPA
does place significant restrictions on the way that U.S. companies do
business abroad, it also places significant restrictions on foreign
competitors. The jurisdictional provisions of the FCPA are ambi-
tiously extraterritorial, and the United States. has increasingly used
these jurisdictional provisions to prosecute foreign corporations for
international bribery, even when the bribery has little or no direct ef-
fect in the United States. 17
This theory of the FCPA's effect on the international bribery
14. See Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and
National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 245, 308 (2010).
15. See Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits flinstitutional Design: Implementing the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 665, 677-78 (2004).
16. Brewster, supra note 14, at 309.
17. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775,
1776 84 (2011) (describing the increase in U.S. prosecutions of foreign firms and arguing
that such prosecutions deserve more scrutiny).
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game thus differs from the conventional wisdom in an important
way. By imposing U.S. law on foreign corporations, this Article ar-
gues, the FCPA has materially reduced the payoffs from bribery for
the majority of large, multinational corporations and thus does not
present the same kinds of unilateral enforcement concerns that previ-
ous theorists have predicted. Instead of exacerbating the collective
action problem underlying efforts to combat corporate bribery, uni-
lateral enforcement appears to have largely resolved them.
At the same time, U.S. enforcement of the FCPA against for-
eign corporations raises different and potentially equally problematic
concerns. Section IV concludes by describing the implications of the
model for multilateral regulation of corruption in the future and dis-
cussing some potential objections to continued aggressive extraterri-
torial enforcement of U.S. law.
I. INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Although political corruption is frustratingly difficult to de-
fine, there is widespread agreement that it is undesirable. When cor-
ruption involves foreign companies paying bribes to legislators from
other countries, and thus takes on international relevance, it is argua-
bly even more objectionable. Indeed, international corruption is of-
ten described as a kind of "global bad." 18 Despite the universal con-
demnation of international corruption, deep structural problems stand
in the way of effective corruption regulation at the international level.
In the absence of domestic regulation, corporations have strong in-
centives to bribe foreign officials for business, but unilateral domes-
tic regulation can actually increase these incentives for some players.
International cooperation could mitigate these obstacles, but the se-
cretive and non-transparent nature of international corruption pre-
vents effective monitoring of any international agreement. Thus, in-
ternational corruption may require some other solution to reduce the
payoffs from bribery for all relevant players.
A. Corruption and Democracy
The focus of this Article is on political corruption, so it may
be useful to begin with a working definition of the term. Political
corruption occurs when a government official abuses his public of-
18. Brewster, supra note 14, at 304.
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fice for improper, private-regarding motives. 19 Of course, distin-
guishing "proper" from "improper" motives may prove difficult in
practice. 20 If we understand democracy as largely a forum for com-
petition between various interest groups, 21 then we may adopt a rela-
19. This definition is inclusive enough to encompass the three most widely accepted
definitions of political corruption. These definitions can be categorized into public-office-
centered, public-interest-centered, and market-centered corruption. See Arnold J.
Heidenheimer, Terms, Concepts, and Definitions: An Introduction, in POLITICAL
CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 3, 8-11 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston & Victor T.
LeVine eds., 1989); see also Michael Johnston, The Definitions Debate: Old Conflicts in
New Guises, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 11, 18 (Arvind K. Jain ed., 2001);
Mark Philp, Defining Political Corruption, 45 POL. STUD. 436, 440 (1997). Of course, these
categories cannot encompass all definitions of corruption, and a number of other theories
exist. See, e.g., Dennis Thompson, Mediated Corruption: The Case o/'the Keating Five, 87
AM. POL. Sc. REv. 369 (1993) (extending corruption to include actions that damage the
democratic process). The first is related to the public duties of government officials. As
Nye has described it, "[c]orruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a
public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding
influence." Nye, supra note 10, at 419. This kind of definition relies on certain formally
established rules of behavior for government officials (public duties) and deviations for
personal advantage (private regarding gain). Another category of corruption definitions
focuses on the public interest. Freidrich, for example, states that corruption exists
"whenever a power holder who is charged with doing certain things, that is a responsible
functionary or office holder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for,
induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the rewards and thereby does
damage to the public and its interests." See Carl J. Friedrich, Corruption Concepts in
Historical Perspective, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 15 (A. J. Heidenheimer,
M. Johnston & V.T. Le Vine, eds., 1989). In addition to the deviation from public duties for
private gain, Friedrich argues that corruption must also involve an action that harms the
public interest. Finally, some theorists have attempted to define corruption as market-
centered behavior: van Klaveren, for example, argues that we should "conceive of
corruption in terms of a civil servant who regards his office as a business, the income of
which he will ... seek to maximize." Jacob van Klaveren, The Concept of Corruption, in
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 26. An alternative market-oriented definition of
corruption states that "corruption = monopoly + discretion accountability." ROBERT
KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 75 (1988). According to this conception of
corruption, a government official acts corruptly if he acts with the purpose of maximizing
his own income, as opposed to some other, presumably public-oriented, good.
20. See Johnston, supra note 19, at 12 (arguing that definitions of corruption "embody
settlements of politically-contested issues, such as where distinctions between public and
private roles and interests lie, or which (and whose) uses of economic and political power
may justly be limited or held accountable to others"); Philp, supra note 19 (identifying a
number of reasons why attempts to define corruption fail).
21. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269
(1987) (arguing that the "democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
2013]
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tively permissive understanding of corruption: as long as all citizens
have equal opportunities to vote, 22 there are few compelling reasons
to prohibit the methods by which citizens may influence each other
and politicians. 23 Each citizen is attempting to realize his prefer-
ences, as against the preferences of others, through the electoral pro-
cess, and each citizen has a legitimate right to express his interests.
Improper motives, in this case, would be connected with violations of
previously established rules of competition.
If, on the other hand, we understand democracy as more
properly a system for reasoned deliberation within a society, we
might understand corruption in a different light. 24 Under deliberative
democracy theory, a government's actions are legitimate if they are
based on public discussion that is not distorted by unequal wealth and
power. 25 This public deliberation simultaneously reflects and shapes
society's preferences, and its aim is to arrive at rationally-motivated
consensus. 26 A variety of actions that might be seen as perfectly ac-
ceptable according to a competitive theory of democracy could fall
afoul of deliberative democratic ideals. Presumably any decision that
competitive struggle for the people's vote"); ROBERT DAHL, PREFACE To DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 68 (2006) (arguing that "[i]n a rough sense, the essence of all competitive politics is
bribery of the electorate by politicians"); Jiirgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of
Democracy, I CONSTELLATIONS 1, 6 (1994) (stating that "[a]ccording to the liberal view, the
democratic process takes place exclusively in the form of compromises between competing
interests") (emphasis in original).
22. "Equal opportunities," in this case, is understood to mean that there are neutral
rules that do not discriminate against any protected group, something akin to Rawls's formal
equality of opportunity. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 63 (1999 rev. ed.).
23. See Habermas, supra note 21, at 6 (arguing that under competitive conceptions of
democracy, "[f]airness is supposed to be granted by the general and equal right to vote, the
representative composition of parliamentary bodies, by decision rules, and so on"). Of
course, even under competitive democracy, we might think that certain rules should govern
how competitors play. The key concept here, though, is that these rules will likely be more
permissive than rules established according to deliberative democratic theories.
24. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY'?
(2004); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 2006); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation
and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND
POLITICS 67 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
25. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 49; David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib,
Fiduciary Laws " Lessons./br Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1254 (2011).
26. See JIJRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 108 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975)
(1973) (explaining that, in ideal deliberation, "no force except that of the better argument is
exercised"); Cohen, supra note 24, at 75 ("[I]deal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally
motivated consensus to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting
on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals.").
[51:360
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would not withstand public scrutiny could be understood as corrup-
tion, and improper motives would likely be determined by reference
to standards of reasoned deliberation by citizens. 
27
For our purposes, however, we will limit our analysis to the
paradigmatic example of political corruption: quid pro quo bribery.
Quidpro quo bribery occurs when an actor explicitly agrees to make
payments to government officials in return for special privileges,
such as government contracts or lower tax rates. 28 It is this kind of
corruption that people most readily identify as bribery, and it is also
this kind of corruption that most anti-bribery laws strive to prevent. 29
International corruption, as opposed to domestic corruption,
occurs when a national of one country bribes a government official of
another country. 30 There is a plausible argument that the case for
regulating international corruption is stronger than the case for regu-
lating domestic corruption. To the extent that we believe that gov-
ernment policies should mirror, or at least internalize and refine, do-
mestic preferences, international corruption is more problematic than
its domestic counterpart. 3' At least from a domestic standpoint, local
citizens may not want the interests of foreign corporations to play
27. See Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institutional Battle Over Anticorruption: Citizens
United, Honest Services, and the Legislative-Judicial Divide, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363,
380 (2011) ("[D]eliberative anticorruption is distinguished by how it defines integrity in
politics: adherence to public standards of justifiability, as defined by the ability to satisfy
discursive assessment.").
28. The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that quid pro quo bribery corruption may
be the only kind of corruption that is validly regulated. In Buckley v. Valeo, for example, the
Court recognized a governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption, as well as
the appearance of it, in the electoral process. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Eisler, supra note 27,
at 423-30 (arguing that the Supreme Court has adopted a view of democracy that leads to a
definition of corruption that tends towards the quid pro quo side of the spectrum). Other
kinds of political corruption, such as dependence corruption, may be equally more
problematic if we think that they systematically bias the decisions of government officials in
favor of certain groups, but they are more controversial and more difficult to identify, and
therefore we will not address them. For an extended discussion of dependence corruption,
see LESSIG, supra note 9, at 226-47.
29. See Bruce E. Yannett, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, in THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2010 721, 733 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook
Series No. 23958, 2010).
30. See Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders, 47
VA. J. INT'LL. 413, 418 19 (2007).
31. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 581, 605 10 (2011) (outlining reasons why the Supreme Court is unlikely to expand its
holding in Citizens United to allow spending by foreign nationals to influence candidate
elections).
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any role in their government institutions. The belief that government
policies should be shaped by domestic actors is shared by both delib-
erative and competitive theories of democracy. 32 It is also reflected
in U.S. law.
33
This is not to suggest that in all cases we will prefer the ac-
tions of domestic individuals over the actions of foreign individuals.
We might very well prefer that a foreign corporation bribe a domestic
legislator if we prefer the foreign corporation's policies. After all,
our analysis of any given corruption problem will depend on much
more than our identification of the nationality of the participants. Ra-
ther, the argument is simply that, all else equal, there are good argu-
ments why foreign corruption should be considered more problematic
than domestic corruption, and these arguments are based on widely
shared premises.
States have a compelling interest in prohibiting international
corporate bribery. Not only does international corruption distort
government decision making, 34 delegitimize political institutions
35
and reduce administrative efficiency, 36 just like domestic corruption,
it also presents an array of special problems, such as wealth trans-
fers, 37 resource extraction 38 and national security issues. 39 Moreover,
32. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 72 (arguing that "the notion of a deliberative
democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the
justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument
and reasoning among equal citizens") (emphasis added); Habennas, supra note 21, at I
(defining politics in a competitive democracy as "the citizens' political will-formation")
(emphasis added).
33. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or
Trust . . . shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument,
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State"); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (explicitly setting aside the
question of whether the government has a "compelling interest in preventing foreign
individuals or associations from influencing our Nation's political process"); 2 U.S.C. §
441e(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting foreign nationals from making contributions or independent
expenditures in connection with a U.S. election).
34. See LESSIG, supra note 9, at 226-47. But see ANECHIARICO & JACOBS, supra note
9, at 174 85 (arguing that prosecution of government corruption may not create a net benefit
for the public).
35. See Nye, supra note 10, at 422 (arguing that "[b]y destroying the legitimacy of
political structures in the eyes of those who have power to do something about the situation,
corruption can contribute to instability and possible national disintegration"); Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 10, at 45.
36. See Caiden & Caiden, supra note 11.
37. See Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through
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international corruption creates externalities for other states as well.
Criminal organizations that thrive off of corruption, such as Mexican
drug cartels or the Russian mafia, export crime to countries around
the world.40 Thus, the harms from international corruption are not
limited to the briber nation (the country whose citizens offer the
bribe) or the bribee nation (the country whose officials receive the
bribe); they extend much more broadly.
Given that international corruption is a kind of "global
bad,"' 4 1 we might expect that international anti-corruption legislation
would be widespread. Until recently, however, international anti-
corruption laws were piecemeal and limited.42 Indeed, until 1998,
many European countries allowed corporations to take tax deductions
for bribes to foreign officials. 43 Why, then, have efforts to combat
international corruption been so unsuccessful? The answer lies in the
International Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 691 (2007)
(describing the wealth-transferring effects of international corruption in Africa).
38. See Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, The Second Scramble./br A4fica ' Oil and Mineral
Resources: Blessing or Curse?, 42 INT'L LAW. 193, 194 (2008) (explaining that the struggle
to extract Africa's natural resources has raised increasing concerns about corruption).
39. Philip M. Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and
Desirable International Policy Goal Under Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth
Century? Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 Mic H. J.
INT'L L. 451 (1999) (arguing that international corruption presents serious national security
concerns).
40. Robert S. Leiken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Winter 1996-1997, at 55 (arguing that "[s]ystemic corruption nurtures local criminal
organizations and has helped to convert major trading partners such as China, Mexico, and
Russia into crime-exporting states"). See also Brewster, supra note 14, at 304-05
(describing corruption as a "global bad").
41. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 304.
42. See Frank C. Razzano & Travis P. Nelson, The Expanding Criminalization of
Transnational Bribery: Global Prosecution Necessitates Global Compliance, 42 INT'L LAW.
1259 (2008) (tracing the history of efforts to combat transnational bribery). In recent years,
however, more countries have begun to implement FCPA-like corruption laws. In 2010, the
United Kingdom enacted its Bribery Act, which some commentators have argued imposes
even greater restrictions on companies than the FCPA does. See Jon Jordan, The Adequate
Procedures Defense Under the UK Bribery Act: A British Idea for the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 17 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 25, 28 (2011). China has also passed an
international corruption law. See Paul R. Berger, China's Nev Push to Combat Foreign
Bribery, FCPA UPDATE (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2011, at 11,
available at http://www.debevoise.com/newseventspubs/publications/detail.aspx?id=d263
dadf-70e8-4bbd-b543-00fafbae8044.
43. See Duane Windsor & Kathleen A. Getz, Multilateral Cooperation to Combat
Corruption: Normative Regimes Despite Mixed Motives and Diverse Values, 33 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 731, 732 (2000).
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nature of international cooperation.
B. Domestic- and International-Focused Corruption Regulation
In adopting anti-bribery legislation, states can adopt two ap-
proaches. The first is purely domestic: they can prohibit the bribery
of domestic politicians. The second is international: they can pro-
hibit the bribery of foreign politicians. The first approach has clearly
been the dominant one, and, until recently, the second approach was
nearly non-existent. 4
4
Purely domestic-oriented legislation has proved ineffectual in
combating international bribery for a number of reasons. First, some
countries lack the ability to actively monitor corruption and enforce
criminal prohibitions.45 Second, even if countries have the ability to
enforce anti-corruption laws, they may lack the will to do so, as the
public-sector demand for bribes is particularly strong in some coun-
tries. 46 Third, multinational corporations are able to circumvent
purely domestic anti-corruption laws by either leaving a jurisdiction
after completing a transaction or by using economic leverage to dis-
suade governments from investigating charges of corruption.
47
For all these reasons, purely domestic anti-corruption legisla-
tion may fail to prevent corrupt behavior by corporations and gov-
ernment officials. Most commentators today agree that an effective
anti-corruption regime must combine legislation prohibiting domestic
corruption with legislation prohibiting foreign corruption. 48 In this
regime, a country prohibits individuals and entities from paying
bribes to any politicians, whether domestic or foreign. This sort of
overlapping regulation reduces the worries about capacity, public-
44. See Nichols, supra note 39, at 453.
45. See Rob Jenkins & Anne-Marie Goetz, Constraints on Civil Society ' Capacity to
Curb Corruption: Lessons.from the Indian Experience, 30 IDS BULL. 39 (1999) (arguing
that many developing countries lack the capacity to prevent corruption).
46. See Norman D. Bishara, Governance and Corruption Constraints in the Middle
East: Overcoming the Business Ethics Glass Ceiling, 48 AM. BuS. L.J. 227, 251 53 (2011)
(identifying political and economic factors that contribute to cultures of corruption).
47. See V. N. Balasubramanyam, M. Salisu & David Sapsford, Foreign Direct
Investment and Growth in EP and IS Countries, 106 ECON. J. 92, 98 (1996) (describing the
extent of developing countries' dependence on foreign investment).
48. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International
Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141, S158 60 (2002)
(explaining how global attitudes about bribery shifted over the course of several decades as a
result of interest and value actors).
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sector demand and circumvention that plague domestic-level corrup-
tion laws, and it provides a more effective disincentive to corpora-
tions from engaging in corrupt behavior.
C. Structural Problems of International Corruption Regulation
The implementation of a comprehensive international corrup-
tion law, however, faces severe structural problems. If a country
prohibits its citizens, including its domestic corporations, from brib-
ing foreign officials, then the cost of bribing will increase for its citi-
zens. If other countries do not implement similar laws, then the regu-
lating country's corporations will be at a competitive disadvantage:
they will no longer be able to offer bribes to foreign officials in re-
turn for government contracts, but their competitors located in other
countries will be able to do so. 49 All else equal, the legislating coun-
try's corporations will lose out on business that they would otherwise
obtain.50 To the extent that politicians within a country desire to
promote the interests of domestic corporations, they may find this re-
sult troubling and therefore hesitate to enact any international anti-
49. See id. at S175-76; Tarullo, supra note 15, at 667; Brewster, supra note 14, at 304-
06.
50. This conclusion depends on some strong assumptions about the behavior of
government officials. The conclusion that the bribing company will defeat the non-bribing
company is based on a relatively simple rational choice model of legislative behavior, but a
number of factors might alter the decisional calculus of the actors. First, the normative
beliefs of government officials may change their perceptions regarding the value of bribes.
If foreign legislators find the acceptance of bribes morally objectionable, they may not value
the bribe highly at all: it is wrong to accept it regardless of its monetary worth. Indeed, to
the extent that government officials are constrained by the norms of their profession, they
may reject outright the possibility of accepting the bribe in return for favorable treatment of
certain interests. Their ideology may trump their material interests. Second, if the foreign
country has enacted strong domestic anti-corruption laws that are enforced rigorously, then
the cost of accepting the bribe increases. The threat of criminal prosecution may dissuade
legislators from accepting bribes or, to the extent that the public demand for bribes persists,
the "going rate" for a bribe will increase. Politicians will increase the amount of bribe
requested to induce them to commit any particular corrupt act. Third, if the bidding process
is sufficiently open and transparent, and government elections sufficiently competitive, then
the prospect of deviating from publicly defensible positions becomes less appealing. If the
details of all the competing bids are made public, then government officials that are
accountable to the public and face re-election may face pressure to award the contract to the
highest (public) bidder. If citizens see that an obviously less favorable bid has been
accepted, they may punish the incumbent legislators by voting for other candidates. But to
the extent that government officials in other countries demand bribes in return for receiving
lucrative government contracts or other business, corporations subject to anti-bribery laws
may lose out on business to rival corporations that are not subject to them.
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corruption legislation without adequate assurance that other countries
will enact similar legislation.
These kinds of structural problems are pervasive in interna-
tional affairs, and there are at least two models for dealing with them.
The first focuses on cooperation and the ability of states to credibly
commit to abide by their promises. The second focuses on unilateral
provision of public goods. This section will analyze each approach
and discuss its application to international corporate bribery.
1. International Cooperation
The traditional way of solving collective action problems in
international relations is cooperation, either through formal treaties or
through informal patterns of behavior.51 In the case of corporate
bribery, this might take the form of an international treaty requiring
all countries to prosecute corporations for paying bribes to foreign of-
ficials, or it might take the form of a tacit agreement for each country
to pass domestic legislation to the same effect. Similar commitments
could be made on an informal, non-binding basis. This kind of coop-
eration is possible as long as (1) the states expect to continue to inter-
act over a sufficiently long time period, (2) the states have adequately
low discount rates, in that they care enough about future payoffs to
sacrifice some amount of present payoffs, and (3) the payoffs from
defection are not so high relative to the payoffs from cooperation that
changes in circumstances could derail cooperation.5 2 If governments
from the relevant states can communicate their intention to cooperate
with other governments, then some form of durable and robust coop-
eration on anti-corruption regulation might develop.
Cooperation, however, requires some credible threat of sanc-
tions for non-cooperation. In other words, if a state faces no punish-
ment for violating the terms of the agreement, then it will have no
reason to incur the costs of cooperation and forego the benefits of
cheating. Punishment may take the form of tit-for-tat violations-
that is, if one state violates the agreement, then other states may re-
ciprocate by doing the same. Punishment may also be more indirect,
such as the refusal by other states to cooperate on other matters of
5 1. See SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE? THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS 47-48 (2007) (describing the kinds of public goods that can be provided only
through cooperation, or so-called "weakest link" goods).
52. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
La, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1126-27 (1999).
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importance to the non-compliant state. 53
Direct and indirect sanctions are powerful motivations for co-
operation in international relations, but there are reasons to doubt
their effectiveness in the context of international anti-corruption
regulation. First, it is at least questionable whether one state's non-
enforcement of anti-corruption norms would provoke tit-for-tat viola-
tions by other states. For example, if China refuses to pass anti-
corruption laws, or fails to enforce those laws, it is unclear whether
the United States would decide to repeal or under-enforce its own an-
ti-corruption laws. Corruption norms may be sufficiently "sticky" to
resist tit-for-tat sanctioning. 54
Second, the threat of sanctions for non-compliance depends
on the ability to identify incidents of non-compliance. If states can-
not monitor the actions of other states, then violations will go unno-
ticed and unpunished. The free flow of information, then, is essential
to cooperation. But bribery does not lend itself to this kind of open
exchange of information. States may be able to monitor the enact-
ment of anti-corruption legislation by other states, but legislation
without enforcement is ineffectual. States will find it difficult to de-
termine whether another state is actively enforcing its laws because
bribery is by its very nature private. Therefore, violations of bribery
norms may be essentially unsanctionable. 55
Thus, international corruption presents a thorny problem. It is
arguably more objectionable from a political standpoint than domes-
tic corruption, and yet it is more difficult to regulate. Each country
has an interest in preventing corruption, but the first mover puts itself
at a disadvantage in comparison with other countries. International
corruption may be a global problem that requires a global solution,
but the usual mechanisms for cooperation in international relations
are ineffectual in the context of corruption regulation.
53. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Design (international Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 579, 595-96 (2005); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of international
Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1870 (2002).
54. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 48, at S 142.
55. There are a few metrics for detenmining whether a state is adequately enforcing its
anti-corruption laws, including the number of actions brought against corporations for
bribery, the amount of resources devoted to anti-corruption units of public prosecutors and
the reports of violations by competitor corporations, but these metrics are rather
unsophisticated. See FRITZ HEIMANN, GILLIAN DELL & KELLY MCCARTHY, TRANSPARENCY
INT'L, PROGRESS REPORT 2011: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
(2011), available at http://files.transparency.org/content/download/102/411/file/2011-
OECDreportEN.pdf.
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2. Unilateral Regulation
So far, the discussion has assumed that one state cannot alter
the payoffs of other states or other states' corporations. When one
country outlaws international corporate bribery, we have assumed
that those laws apply solely to that country's corporations and thus
that foreign companies are free to bribe without the threat of prosecu-
tion by the regulating state. To the extent that corporate bribery laws
reduce the payoffs from bribery, unilateral disarmament advantages
corporations from jurisdictions not subject to anti-bribery laws.
But what if one state passes an anti-bribery law that has uni-
versal application? That is, what if one state enacts anti-bribery
regulations that purport to reach the activities of both domestic and
foreign corporations? If these regulations effectively reduce the pay-
offs from bribery to all the relevant actors in the international corpo-
rate bribery game, both foreign and domestic, then they might avoid
the adverse consequences of unilateral disarmament and achieve the
beneficial consequences of governmental cooperation, without the
need for formal international agreement. Unilateral enforcement can
therefore be an effective alternative to multilateral cooperation.
One country's enactment of universally applicable corporate
bribery laws can also affect the behavior of other governments.
Whereas previously each government had an incentive to refrain
from passing anti-bribery legislation in order to give its corporations
a competitive advantage, now the passage of such legislation does
not significantly harm the country's corporations. Those corpora-
tions are already subject to bribery laws under another country's
laws, and thus the corporations will likely refrain from bribery re-
gardless of home country regulation. 56 Unilateral regulation, then,
may reduce international opposition to anti-bribery laws.
Under this model of international corporate bribery, one state
unilaterally provides the public good of corruption regulation without
the necessity of multilateral cooperation. 57 This model is largely
consistent with the predictions of hegemonic stability theory.58 Heg-
56. The passage of home country regulation may make it more likely that corporations
will refrain from engaging in international bribery. If, for example, the universal regulation
does not impose a sufficient disincentive to bribery on corporations, then the possibility of
additional prosecution at home might provide the cost necessary to make corporations
change their minds.
57. See BARRETT, supra note 51, at 22 24 (describing "single best efforts" public
goods, which can be provided by one actor acting alone).
58. See Duncan Snidal, The Limits o;Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 INT'L ORG. 579
(1986); CHARLES KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION, 1929 1939 (1974); Charles
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emonic stability theory asserts that, in certain circumstances, a single,
strongly dominant actor can unilaterally provide public goods to all
states. 59 The important insight of hegemonic stability theory is that if
one state is sufficiently large, 60 it will be able to capture enough of
the benefits from global public goods so as to offset the costs of uni-
lateral provision of those goods. 61 A hegemonic power might also be
Kindleberger, Systems of International Economic Organization, in MONEY AND THE COMING
WORLD ORDER (David Calleo, ed., 1976); ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
59. See Snidal, supra note 58, at 579.
60. The concept of size in hegemonic stability theory is a complex one, and it is not
entirely clear whether size should be determined by relative size compared to other states or
absolute size. See Snidal, supra note 58, at 585. The important point, though, is that if a
state can capture enough of the gains from public goods, they may be willing to provide
those public goods, even at significant cost.
61. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). A graphical
representation of this concept may prove useful. This model is derived from Duncan
Snidal's discussion of size and the problem of international cooperation. Id. at 598-602.
Figure 1 shows the incentives of states to cooperate or defect in any given issue area. It
assumes that cooperation is costly for any particular state but collectively useful. As the
figure demonstrates, the benefits of cooperation increase as more states cooperate (the slope
of C is rising). Regardless of the number of states cooperating, however, the line D is
always higher than the line C, and thus it is always in the interest of any individual state to
defect rather than cooperate. If all states follow this logic, they will end up with a payoff of
0. On the other hand, if a group of states equal to or greater than "k" can form a coalition, it
may be in the interest of those states to cooperate and provide the public good, as line C
crosses the horizontal axis at that point. Those states will do better by cooperating than by









The important insight of hegemonic stability theory is that the relative size of states matters
in determining whether states will cooperate. If there is a state that is sufficiently large, then
k may be equal to 1.
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able to tax other states for its provision of the good. 62
Two conditions must hold true for the predictions of hege-
monic stability theory to apply: first, the hegemonic state must have
sufficient incentive to provide the good; and second, the hegemonic
state must have the ability to provide the good. A state's willingness
to provide a public good unilaterally will be affected by the state's
size: if it captures a sufficient portion of the benefits of the public
good, relative to the cost of provision, then it will have an incentive
to act even without the cooperation of other states. A state's ability
to provide the good, on the other hand, depends on the type of good
that is being provided.63 In the context of corruption, it depends on
(1) the ability to monitor corporate bribery and (2) the jurisdiction to
prosecute and punish corporations that engage in bribery. In other
words, only states that can alter the payoffs of foreign corporations
will be able to follow the path of unilateral enforcement. Not every
state will have these capabilities, but if a state is willing and able to
provide the good unilaterally, then the prisoners' dilemma of corpo-
Figure 2 demonstrates that if k1, the hegemonic state should be willing to cooperate
even if no other states cooperate. If the large state cooperates, it will be able to increase its
payoff from 0 to N. Other states will be able to "free ride" off the hegemon's cooperation
and receive even greater payoffs, located at M. All states are better off by the hegemon's
unilateral provision of the public good, assuming that the hegemonic state cannot impose a





Sk 1 2 34 Sae
L Cooperating
If, however, the size of the hegemon declines beneath k, or if other states believe that k is
greater than 1, then other states, such as states 2 and 3, could potentially be convinced to
cooperate with state 1, so as to increase each cooperating state's payoffs to S or Q from 0.
62. See ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 34 (1982).
63. See BARRETT, supra note 51, at 20 (categorizing the kinds of public goods and the
levels of cooperation required for their provision).
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rate bribery might be solved without international cooperation.
II. THE FCPA AND THE STANDARD ACCOUNT
Despite the strong structural impediments to international cor-
ruption regulation, such regulation exists today. The United States
acted first, passing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in
1977.64 The FCPA prohibited entities from making payments to for-
eign officials in return for business. 65 Standard accounts of the
FCPA understand the Act as an example of how domestic politics
can overcome prisoners' dilemmas and lead to international agree-
ment. 66 The FCPA motivated U.S. corporations to pressure their
government to conclude a comprehensive international anti-
corruption agreement. 67 This domestic pressure, the story goes, led
to negotiation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997, but the
Anti-Bribery Convention ultimately did not alter the payoff structure
for countries. 68 The standard account thus views the FCPA as a kind
of unilateral disarmament. This section will analyze the standard
theory of the FCPA and discuss some of the difficulties that the theo-
ry faces.
A. The Enactment of the FCPA
The FCPA was an important milestone in the history of inter-
national corporate bribery regulation, and the moral significance of
its passage should not be overlooked. The FCPA was enacted in the
aftermath of the Watergate scandal, and it stood for some time as the
only regulation of international bribery by any country in the world.69
This section will trace the history of the FCPA's enactment and de-
scribe its major substantive provisions.
1. The History of the FCPA
The United States might never have passed the FCPA had it
64. See Yannett, supra note 29, at 724.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2006).
66. See in/ra note 93.
67. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 308.
68. Id.
69. See Jordan, supra note 42, at 42 n.77.
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not been for the Watergate scandal. In 1976, when it became widely
known that corporations had used slush funds to make illegal politi-
cal contributions to politicians, Congress and the SEC began to in-
vestigate the existence and use of these slush funds. 70 What was un-
covered has been described as "the most extensive documentation of
business-government corruption ever produced in history."' 7 1 The
main purpose of the corporate slush funds was to pay bribes to for-
eign officials in order to obtain business in those countries. 72 In one
particularly infamous example, Lockheed Corporation paid $1.8 mil-
lion in bribes to the Japanese prime minister in order to win a con-
tract for the sale of passenger aircraft.7 3 These revelations led to the
arrest of the Japanese prime minister and his eventual conviction for
securities fraud. 74 By the mid-1970s, over 400 U.S. companies had
admitted to paying more than $300 million in bribes to foreign offi-
cials. 7
5
In the wake of these disclosures, Congress set out to prevent
such behavior in the future. U.S. legislators argued that international
corruption had tarnished "the image of American democracy
abroad," impaired "[c]onfidence in the financial integrity of our cor-
porations," and hampered "[t]he efficient functioning of our capital
markets."' 76 They concluded that "[a] strong antibribery law [was]
urgently needed to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to re-
store public confidence in the integrity of the American business sys-
70. See Roberta S. Kannel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas: The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 79, 86-87 (2005).
71. Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 350 (2000).
72. The SEC discovered that the large campaign contributions were coming from
corporate slush funds that were maintained off the books of the corporations. Corporations
would establish the slush funds by making payments to foreign agents or consultants, who
would then return the money to the corporation in an off-the-book fund. Only a small
portion of these funds went to campaign contributions; the rest went to "questionable
payments" to obtain or retain business abroad. Wallace Timmeny, An Overview of the
FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 235, 235 (1982). See also David A. Gantz,
Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a New International
Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 457, 459 (1998).
73. See Daniel Mabrey, Lockheed Bribing Scandal, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME 175 76 (Jurg Gerber & Eric L. Jensen, eds. 2007).
74. See James Sterngold, Kakuei Tanaka, 75, Ex-Premier and Political Force in
Japan, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at B14.
75. See H.R. RiP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
76. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101.
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tern." 77
The Senate and House of Representatives passed the FCPA
without a single vote in opposition, making the United States the first
country to prohibit its nationals from bribing foreign officials.7 8 No-
tably, when signing the Act into law, President Jimmy Carter also
signaled his worries about the potential consequences of being the
first mover. Carter encouraged other nations to make progress on the
negotiation of a multilateral anti-corruption treaty, stating that the ef-
fort to combat corporate bribery overseas "can only be fully success-
ful ... if other countries and business itself take comparable ac-
tion."' 79 The emphasis on global cooperation would be a constant
refrain over the next twenty years.
2. The Structure of the FCPA
The structure of the FCPA is relatively simple. It targets in-
ternational corporate bribery through two general provisions: first,
an anti-bribery provision; and second, an accounting and financial
controls provision. Individuals and corporations that violate the pro-
visions are subject to substantial criminal and civil sanctions. 80
i. Anti-Bribery Provisions
The anti-bribery provisions prohibit U.S. issuers and domestic
concerns from making or promising to make payments, either direct-
ly or indirectly, of money or anything of value to a foreign official,
party or party official or candidate, with corrupt intent, in order to ob-
tain or retain business. 81 An "issuer" is defined as a company that
has registered securities or that is required to file reports with the
77. Id. at 4.
78. See Yannett, supra note 29, at 724.
79. Presidential Statement on Signing the Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment
Disclosure Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2), 78ff(c)(2) (2006).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a). The FCPA notably does not prohibit the acceptance of
bribes by foreign officials. Thus, it deals solely with the supply-side of bribes, not the
demand-side. See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding
that the government could not "refute the overwhelming evidence of a Congressional intent
to exempt foreign officials from prosecution for receiving bribes, especially since Congress
knew it had the power to reach foreign officials in many cases, and yet declined to exercise
that power").
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SEC. 82 A "domestic concern" is defined as a "citizen, national, or
resident of the United States" and "any corporation, partnership, as-
sociation, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organ-
ization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of busi-
ness in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a
State of the United States or a territory, possession, or common-
wealth of the United States." 83 In 1998, the FCPA was amended to
extend its application to any person, including foreign persons, as
long as an act in furtherance of the violation is committed in the
United States.
84
The Act exempts "grease payments," or payments solely in-
tended to "expedite or secure the performance of a routine govern-
mental action," from the bribery prohibition. 85 It also includes two
affirmative defenses. The first defense applies if the payment was
lawful under the laws of the foreign official's country. 86 The second
defense applies if the payment was a "reasonable and bona fide ex-
penditure" directly related either to the promotion and demonstration
of products and services or to the execution and performance of a
contract with a foreign government. 87
ii. Accounting Provisions
The accounting provisions require issuers to "make and keep
books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
issuer." 88 In effect, this means that corporations must use "generally
accepted accounting principles" when they record their transac-
tions. 89 The accounting provisions are animated by a desire to pro-
hibit corporations from disguising inappropriate payments through
inaccurate financial reporting, a practice that was quite frequent in
the pre-Watergate era. 90 Some commentators have described the
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(l)(A) (B).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(1).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
89. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4105.
90. See Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269, 274
[51:360
INTERNA TIONAL CORPORATE BRIBERY
reach and impact of the accounting provisions as "extraordinarily po-
tent," as violations of the accounting provisions are easier to prove
than violations of the bribery provisions. 91
The passage of the FCPA marked a watershed moment in the
history of anti-corruption legislation. Before 1976, countries had
fought corruption through purely domestic anti-bribery laws: they
prohibited individuals from paying bribes to their own government
officials. With the FCPA, however, the United States became the
first country to adopt an international approach to fighting corruption,
one in which they prohibited domestic concerns, and later foreign in-
dividuals, from bribing foreign officials. U.S. corporations were
thereby prohibited from going abroad and engaging in the kinds of
corrupt behavior that would be illegal at home. The United States
stood largely alone in this effort until a multilateral treaty, the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, was concluded in 1998.92
B. Standard Accounts of the FCPA
Once the FCPA entered into force, an important question
arose for international corruption theorists. How did the unilateral
enactment of international anti-bribery laws by one state affect the
preferences of other states regarding corruption? In other words,
now that the United States had indicated that it would prosecute do-
mestic concerns if they bribed foreign officials, how would this im-
pact the incentives of other countries and their corporations with re-
spect to international corruption? Would it create pressure for other
countries to follow suit and enact anti-bribery laws, or would it do
the opposite, further entrenching opposition to anti-corruption regula-
tion?
The standard account of the FCPA begins with the assertion
that the FCPA placed American corporations at a disadvantage in
comparison with foreign-based firms.93 By imposing civil and crim-
(1998) ("Bribery needs secrecy in order to flourish. Thus, I theorized that requiring the
disclosure of all bribes paid would, in effect, foreclose that activity.").
91. See Stuart H. Deming, The Potent and Broad-Ranging Implications of the
Accounting and Record-Keeping Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 493 (2006).
92. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998)
(entered into force Feb. 13, 1999) [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].
93. See David Chaikin, Extraterritoriality and the Criminalization fForeign Bribes,
in CORRUPTION: THE ENEMY WITHIN 285, 289 90 (Barry Rider ed., 1997); Abbott & Snidal,
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inal fines on U.S. corporations that make payments to foreign offi-
cials in order to obtain or retain business, the FCPA increases the
cost of bribery for U.S.-based companies. 94 Foreign competitors, on
the other hand, would not face this increased cost and, indeed, in
many countries could actually deduct the cost of bribes as a business
expense. 95 Thus, to the extent that foreign officials demanded or
were swayed by bribes, U.S. corporations faced steep obstacles to
winning foreign government contracts when foreign corporations
provided competing bids. Under this model, the passage of the
FCPA represented unilateral disarmament by the United States.
The competitive constraints that U.S. corporations faced un-
der the FCPA caused U.S. companies to adopt a two-pronged strate-
gy, both prongs of which aimed at leveling the international playing
field. First, U.S. companies agitated for the amendment or repeal of
the Act, as a way of reducing the increased costs of bribery to domes-
tic companies. 96 With international corruption de-criminalized, U.S.
corporations would no longer face higher bribery costs than their for-
eign rivals and could thus compete more effectively. Second, and in
the alternative, they pressured the U.S. government to negotiate a
multilateral anti-corruption treaty in order to impose the same addi-
tional costs of bribery upon foreign corporations. 97 A multilateral an-
ti-corruption treaty would force all countries to prohibit international
corruption, and thus foreign rivals would no longer have lower costs
of bribery than U.S. companies.
supra note 48, at S 162; Brewster, supra note 14, at 303-11; Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The
Efiectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 39 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 634, 635 (2008);
Kevin E. Davis, Why Does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery: Moralism, Self-
Interest, or Altruism, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498 (2012); Leiken, supra note 40,
at 70; Lucinda A. Low, Transnational Corruption: New Rules f)r Old Temptations, New
Players To Combat a Perennial Evil, 92 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 151, 153 (1998); Tarullo,
supra note 15, at 675-76. It should be noted that the standard account does not represent the
only account of the FCPA. Practitioners, in particular, have been in the vanguard of
identifying and describing the growing trend of foreign prosecutions under the FCPA. See
Kimberly A. Parker, Anti-Corruption Eniorcement: Trends and Analysis 2010 2011, in
WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2011: PROSECUTORS AND REGULATORS SPEAK (PLI Corp. L. & Prac.,
Course Handbook Series No. 28257, 2011).
94. See Low, supra note 93, at 152; Paul B. Stephan II, International Law in the
Supreme Court, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 140-41 (1990).
95. In 1997, half of the member states of the OECD allowed corporations to deduct
bribes to foreign officials as business expenses. See Leiken, supra note 40, at 70; Windsor
& Getz, supra note 43, at 732.
96. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 308.
97. Id.
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The first prong of attack against the FCPA, that of weakening
or repealing the Act, failed to garner Congressional support. 98 Exist-
ing literature identifies two key reasons for this failure. First, not all
corporations backed the effort to repeal the FCPA. 99 Some corpora-
tions believed that an anti-corruption law was actually good for busi-
ness because it forced corporations to operate efficiently and compete
honestly. 100 As one observer noted:
there was a concern that U.S. business did not know
what was good for itself, and to continue along these
lines, relying on bribery, was not in the best interest of
U.S. business. We had to develop the strength to
compete based on quality of product and not on our
ability to make a payment in a black bag. 101
Without sufficient support from the broader corporate sector, multi-
national corporations leading the charge to repeal the FCPA failed to
exert real pressure on Congress. Second, some scholars have ex-
plained the failure of efforts to weaken the FCPA as a triumph of
values. 10 2 Even if the FCPA harmed the interests of U.S. corpora-
tions, the anti-corruption norm was sufficiently "sticky" to make re-
peal an unrealistic option. No legislator would vote in favor of a bill
that appeared to encourage corruption abroad. 103
The second prong of attack, that of negotiating an internation-
al treaty, achieved more success. This approach had broad support
from the U.S. business community. 104 President Carter himself had
98. In 1988, Congress amended the FCPA to clarify the meaning of several provisions
and, in particular, the meaning of key accounting provisions. These amendments, however,
did not significantly alter the statutory framework described above. See Adam Fremantle &
Sherman Katz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of1988, 23 INT'L L. 755
(1989).
99. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 308.
100. See Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent
FCPA Enfrcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 427 (2011);
Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corporate
Responsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 389, 442-46 (1997).
101. Timmeny, supra note 72, at 238.
102. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 48, at S 162.
103. It should be noted that the values dynamic at play here is not necessarily acting
directly on legislators. As Abbott and Snidal explain it, "[v]alues (whether held by the
legislators themselves or by value actors in their constituencies) proved an insurmountable
constraint." Id.
104. See Tarullo, supra note 15, at 675; Hongying Wang & James N. Rosenau,
Transparency International and Corruption as an Issue of Global Governance, 7 GLOBAL
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remarked when signing the FCPA that the Act would be ineffectual
without multilateral cooperation. 105 Legislators recognized that
without reciprocal anti-corruption laws in other countries, bribery
might simply shift abroad, where countries continued to condone the
payment of bribes to foreign officials. The prospect of leveling the
playing field for U.S. corporations by raising the standards of honesty
and fair dealing in other countries, rather than lowering them in the
United States, was more palatable to U.S. government officials and
the business community. 106
This confluence of values-based and interest-based motiva-
tions led the U.S. government to attempt to conclude an international
agreement regulating transnational bribery. 107 These efforts were
largely unsuccessful for two decades. The standard account attrib-
utes the failure of these efforts to the competitive advantage that the
FCPA had given to foreign corporations. 10 8 The U.S. government
had unilaterally disarmed by adopting the FCPA, and its subsequent
behavior demonstrated that the FCPA would not be repealed. 109 At
the same time, governments abroad faced pressure to maintain the
comparative advantage of their corporations: European officials
openly acknowledged that their corporations "needed a competitive
edge over their more efficient U.S. competitors." 110 As mentioned
above, unilateral disarmament increases the payoffs from bribery for
other parties, and higher payoffs from non-cooperative behavior low-
er the prospects for cooperation. Therefore, the United States had
less leverage to negotiate an international agreement, and foreign
governments faced pressure to maintain the competitive advantage of
their corporations.
GOVERNANCE 25, 41 (2001).
105. See Statement on Signing, supra note 79, at 2157.
106. In the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, Congress noted the importance of
concluding an international agreement. The amendments included a provision stating that:
[i]t is the sense of the Congress that the President should pursue the negotiation
of an international agreement, among the members of the Organization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, to govern persons from those countries
concerning acts prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic concerns by the
amendments made by this section.
Section 5003(d) of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Section
5003(d), PuB. L. No. 100-418, 102 STAT. 1415. See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 48, at
S162; Tarullo, supra note 15, at 676 n.31.
107. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 48, at S 162.
108. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 308 09.
109. Tarullo, supra note 15, at 677.
110. Id. at674n.26.
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By the mid-1990s, however, international opposition to an
anti-bribery treaty weakened, and negotiations at the OECD made
progress.''' Scholars have identified a number of reasons for this
shift. First, the U.S. government began to link the conclusion of an
international agreement to other issues, communicating to its partners
that progress on issues of importance to other countries would stall
until a treaty was concluded. 112 Second, a series of national corrup-
tion scandals in Europe contributed to a shift in public opinion re-
garding international corruption, forcing or at least encouraging Eu-
ropean governments to act on this issue. 113  Third, the rise of
globalization increased the economic and social costs of corruption
for developing countries, and developing countries themselves began
to press for an international agreement.'1 14 Fourth, the cost of adopt-
ing anti-corruption legislation decreased, as the fall of the Soviet Un-
ion and the opening of formerly Communist countries to the free
market increased competition for capital from international financial
institutions, institutions with robust anti-corruption compliance pro-
grams that already prohibited the payment of bribes. 
115
These changes in interests and values led to the eventual con-
clusion of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, a multilateral agree-
ment requiring its members to criminalize the making of payments to
foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business or other improp-
er advantages.'1 16 By its terms, the agreement should have solved the
prisoner's dilemma of international corruption: all the members col-
lectively agreed to prohibit their nationals from making bribes
abroad, and thus no country needed to worry about foreign corpora-
tions gaining the upper hand by bribing foreign officials. 117 Presum-
111. Id. at677 78.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 678 79; Brewster, supra note 14, at 309; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 48, at
S164; Patrick Glynn, Stephen J. Kobrin & Moises Naim, The Globalization of#Corruption,
in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL EcONOMY 7, 21 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997);
Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, Arrested Development: The Fight Against
International Corporate Bribery, 92 NAT'L INTEREST 80, 81 (2007).
114. See Tarullo, supra note 15, at 679; Wang & Rosenau, supra note 104, at 34-35;
GEORGE MOODY-STUART, GRAND CORRUPTION: How BUSINESS BRIBES DAMAGE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 41 (3d ed. 1997).
115. See Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the
Threshold o/ the Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current
Domestic and International EfIbrts Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'LL. 1, 17 (1999).
116. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 92, art. 8.
117. Seegenerally id.
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ably, U.S. corporations would no longer be at a competitive disad-
vantage.
The Anti-Bribery Convention, however, has suffered from
severe under-enforcement by its member-states. 118 Treaty members
lacked either the desire or the ability to prosecute their own nationals
in a robust way. 119 Without a credible commitment by the home
countries of multinational corporations to prosecute incidents of brib-
ery abroad, these companies had no reason to alter their behavior.
For current scholars, the passage of the Anti-Bribery Conven-
tion did not change the overall interests of governments because the
compliance pull of the Anti-Bribery Treaty was low. Some explain
the weakness of the Convention as merely another example of the
weakness of international law: states make rational decisions and
compliance with international law, in the absence of the threat of
credible sanctions for non-compliance, has little value for them. 120
Others point to the structural weaknesses in the treaty itself: compli-
ance with the treaty is difficult to monitor, as corruption is by its very
nature a secretive enterprise. 121 If other countries cannot identify and
punish violations of the Convention, then absent some change in the
payoff structure, the treaty is unlikely to force countries to change
their behavior. 122 As long as countries fail to enforce their interna-
l18. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 309; Tarullo, supra note 15, at 680 90; David L.
Heifetz, Japan's Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Weaker and Less
Fjective Than the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 209
(2002); Daniel Patrick Ashe, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso o/ the United States: The
Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2897, 2915 16 (2005). From 2000 to 2010, the United States brought more than 3.5
times more foreign bribery enforcement actions than all other countries combined. See
TRACE, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 4 (2011), available at http://www.ibe.org.uk/
userfiles/globalenforcementreport2011 .pdf.
119. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 309; Tarullo, supra note 15, at 683. According to
Transparency International, the major enforcement-related problems that countries face
include inadequate resources, decentralized or uncoordinated enforcement, lack of
coordination between investigation and prosecution, lack of specialized training, and
inadequate complaints systems and/or whistle-blower protections. See Heimann, Dell &
McCarthy, supra note 55, at 10-11.
120. Id.
121. Tarullo, supra note 15, at 689.
122. Id. This argument assumes that the act of promising to abide by international legal
norms does not carry with it an inherent compliance pull. This assumption is not universally
accepted, and a number of scholars from across the political spectrum have identified
mechanisms by which international law may exert pressure on countries to comply. See
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice
Approach, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 113 (2003); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW
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tional anti-corruption laws, corporations from those countries will not
see a rise in the cost of bribing foreign officials and will continue to
bribe at rates similar to those seen before the conclusion of the Anti-
Bribery Convention.
The premise of the standard account is that the FCPA put
American corporations at a disadvantage in international business
transactions because it made it impossible, or at least highly risky, for
them to bribe foreign officials, while competitors abroad could con-
tinue to engage in these practices without fear of prosecution. This
situation, however, caused U.S. corporations to change their behav-
ior. By putting American corporations at a disadvantage, the FCPA
had also created a strong interest group within the United States in
favor of an international agreement: if U.S. corporations could not
repeal the FCPA in order to create a level playing field, they wanted
to make sure that their foreign competitors faced similar restrictions.
The U.S. government responded to this interest group pressure by
negotiating the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which committed its
signatories to outlawing the bribery of foreign officials. As ex-
plained above, however, the Convention failed to change the payoff
structure of other countries. Other countries continued to tacitly
permit the bribery of foreign officials, while the United States con-
tinued to engage in aggressive anti-bribery efforts. This situation left
U.S. corporations, in an important sense, in the same position: they
still faced a competitive disadvantage in the effort to win lucrative
government business and contracts abroad.
C. Criticisms of the Standard Account
This story about the FCPA and its effects on international
corporate bribery has intuitive appeal and is, in many ways, quite
convincing. Domestic regulations can and do impose costs on busi-
ness, and these costs can affect the competitiveness of those busi-
nesses internationally. But the standard account raises a number of
questions that it fails to answer, and these questions create the suspi-
cion that some important explanatory factor has been overlooked.
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); Andrew T. F. Lang, Reconstructing
Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of
the International Trade Regime, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 81 (2006); Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998
Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hogs. L. REV. 623 (1998); William
Magnuson, The Domestic Politics of International Extradition, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 839
(2012).
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1. Lack of Empirical Evidence
First, current theory relies on the assumption that the enact-
ment of the FCPA in fact put U.S. corporations at a competitive dis-
advantage with respect to foreign competitors in the market for inter-
national business transactions. 123 U.S. corporations have complained
for years that they face severe impediments to securing international
business deals because they face FCPA liability. 124 Given the nearly
universal acceptance by scholars and companies of this proposition,
one might expect that there would be strong empirical evidence for
this claim. But the opposite is true. Empirical studies of the effect of
the FCPA on U.S. business have been decidedly mixed. 125 If the
FCPA places U.S. corporations at a significant disadvantage, then
why have empirical studies had such a difficult time finding an effect
on U.S. business?
One response might be that U.S. corporations are so much
123. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 307 ("After the passage of the FCPA, American
finns faced a significant disadvantage when competing for international contracts.");
Tarullo, supra note 15, at 667 (describing the "systematic disadvantages of U.S.
multinationals"); Christopher L. Hall, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Competitive
Disadvantage, But For How Long?, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289 (1994).
124. See Glynn, Korbin & Naim, supra note 113, at 18; Glenn A. Pitman & James P.
Sanford, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Revisited: Attempting to Regulate Ethical
Bribes in Global Business, 30 INT'L J. PURCHASING & MATERIALS MGMT. 15 (1994); JYOTI
N. PRASAD, IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977 ON U.S. EXPORTS
(1993).
125. Some find that the FCPA has had no competitive effect on U.S. business. See John
L. Graham, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A New Perspective, 15 J. INT'L BUS. STUD.
107 (1984) (finding no evidence that the U.S. share of exports to bribery-prone countries had
declined after the FCPA was enacted); Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing Is Corruption on
International Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2000) (finding that U.S. investors are
not significantly less likely to invest in corrupt countries than other investors); Beata
Smarzynska & Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption and Composition ofForeign Direct Investment:
Firm-Level Evidence (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7969, 2000),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7969 (finding that US investors are not more
sensitive than other investors to corruption in the host country). Others find that the FCPA
has hurt the United States in certain markets but not others. See Paul J. Beck, Michael W.
Maher & Adrian E. Tschoegl, The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on US
Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 295 (1991) (finding that the FCPA had no
effect on U.S. exports to Latin America, but a negative effect on U.S. exports to non-Latin
American countries). Others find that the FCPA has negatively affected the competitiveness
of U.S. business. See James R. Hines, Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American
Business After 1977 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf (finding that the FCPA caused U.S.
business activities in bribe-prone countries to decline).
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more competitive than their foreign rivals that, even with the in-
creased costs of bribery and the structural disadvantage that imposes
on U.S. corporations, they still win international contracts. But the
mechanisms by which this might work have not been fully worked
out. If a U.S. company offers to build a highway for $500 million
and fails to bribe, while a foreign company offers to build a highway
for $600 million and pays bribes of $50 million, it is unclear what
would induce a bribe-prone official to award the contract to the U.S.
company. Even if the U.S. company became more efficient and
could build the highway for $250 million, it would likely still be in
the official's interest to take the $50 million bribe from the foreign
company. Unless there is some method of public oversight and do-
mestic pressure, increased competitiveness would not overcome the
effects of the FCPA.
Thus, empirical research on the FCPA undermines the asser-
tion that the FCPA puts U.S. corporations at a disadvantage, an asser-
tion on which many corruption theorists rely. Without strong empiri-
cal evidence of the FCPA's anti-competitive effect, there are reasons
to be skeptical about the standard account.
2. Lack of Sanctions for Non-Compliance
Current theory also fails to explain why the non-compliance
of treaty partners with the obligations of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention has not led to a change in behavior by the United States.
Many scholars have noted that the signatories of the Anti-Bribery
Convention have under-enforced the criminal prohibition on interna-
tional corruption. 126 Indeed, prosecutions have been few and far be-
tween: by 2004, only one country (other than the United States) had
126. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 309 ("Compliance with the OECD treaty is lacking
because governments see an advantage to cheating on the agreement."); Tarullo, supra note
15, at 680-90 ("The obvious explanation for the lack of prosecutions [for international
bribery] is that OECD members lack either the will or the capacity to meet their
obligations."); Heifetz, supra note 118, at 209 ("[T]he Japanese legislative efforts [to
enforce the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention] to date are not in keeping with the spirit of the
OECD Convention and are probably insufficient to meet the Convention's standards."). But
see Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, ho Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT'L BuS. STUD. 807
(2006) (finding that signatories of the Anti-Bribery Convention invest less in countries with
high levels of corruption than do non-signatories). For a description of the tradeoffs
between form and substance of international agreements, and the rationales for weak
monitoring of international commitments, see Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in
International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 582 (2005) (arguing that "the widespread
preference for contracts often unduly weakens the substance and structure of multilateral
agreements when states are uncertain about compliance costs").
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initiated a prosecution for overseas bribery. 127 By 2012, enforcement
has improved slightly, but Transparency International has concluded
that 21 of the 37 member states have little or no enforcement of the
Convention's obligations. 128 The United States, on the other hand,
continues to actively enforce the FCPA's prohibitions and has actual-
ly ramped up prosecutions in recent years. 129 But why has the failure
by other countries to live up to their obligations under the Anti-
Bribery Convention not led to a reaction by the United States? Basic
game theory asserts that violations of cooperative agreements can be
deterred by a tit-for-tat strategy. 130 Thus, one might expect the Unit-
ed States to react to continued non-compliance by its treaty partners
with a non-cooperative move, such as relaxed enforcement. 131 In-
stead, it has done the opposite.
One explanation is that the United States would like to re-
spond to the non-cooperation of its treaty partners with reciprocal
non-cooperation, but that it simply does not have that option. The
executive branch is not in the business of telling its prosecutors to ig-
nore the law. 132 More importantly, anti-corruption norms are suffi-
ciently "sticky" to make under-enforcement of those norms deeply
problematic, both morally and politically. 133  No administration
127. And that prosecution was brought by Canada against a Canadian company for
bribing a U.S. customs official in order to gain advantage over another Canadian company.
See Robert Remington, Alberta Oiltield Firm Faces Bribery Charges, NAT'L POST
(Toronto), July 3, 2002, at A8.
128. See Heimann, Dell & McCarthy, supra note 55, at 5.
129. See Ivonne Mena King, Alexander J. Kramer & Lori A. Rubin, Ever Expanding
FCPA En/brcement: Lindsey and Tenaris, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2011: PROSECUTORS
AND REGULATORS SPEAK 371 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. 28257,
2011); Mike Koehler, The Facade oIFCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907 (2010).
130. A tit-for-tat strategy is one in which an actor begins with a cooperative move and
then does whatever the other actor did on the previous move. Thus, if the other actor cheats
on one move, then the actor will cheat on the next move. See Richard Axelrod, The
Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, in GENETIC ALGORITHMS AND
SIMULATED ANNEALING (Lawrence Davis ed., 1987).
131. But see Guzman, supra note 53, at 588-89 (arguing that direct sanctions for
violations of international agreements are rare and that reputational sanctions are more
common). See also Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory q! international Law, supra note
53, at 1823.
132. But see David Stout & Solomon Moore, U.S. Won't Prosecute in States That Allow
Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009, at Al (describing the Department of
Justice's decision to refrain from prosecuting people who use marijuana for medical
purposes and medical marijuana distributors in states that have legalized medical marijuana
use).
133. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 48, at S142. In addition, a report by the
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would want to defend a policy allowing corporations to bribe gov-
ernments around the world. Another response is that international
corruption's importance as a political issue has waned since the Anti-
Bribery Convention's conclusion. Domestic interest groups lobbied
the U.S. government to negotiate an international agreement, and the
agreement's conclusion may have been enough to diffuse that pres-
sure. Enforcement efforts are less visible and thus may not motivate
the same kinds of political coalitions that international negotiations
do.134 These explanations, however, are inconsistent. The first
claims that international corruption is too important to ignore, while
the other asserts that it is too trivial to monitor. Similarly, they both
presume that the United States has not actually sanctioned states for
violations, a curious assumption that will be explored further in the
following section.
III. THE FCPA AS A UNILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
The conventional model of the FCPA as unilateral disarma-
ment by the United States has one fatal flaw: it fundamentally mis-
understands the international anti-corruption game because it fails to
grasp the extraterritorial elements of the FCPA. The FCPA's ambi-
tiously extraterritorial jurisdictional provisions extend the Act's pro-
hibitions to any corporation that issues stock on a U.S. stock ex-
change, has American depository receipts trading in the United
States, engages in any part of the bribery transaction in the United
States or utilizes U.S. banks to facilitate any bribery transaction.135
Committee on International Business Transactions of the New York City Bar has suggested
that the intensified enforcement of the FCPA may be explained by the personal incentives of
U.S. prosecutors eager to "perform." Committee on International Business Transactions,
The FCPA and Its Impact on International Business Transactions: Should Anything Be Done
to Minimize the Consequences of the U.S. 's Unique Position on Combating Offhore
Corruption? 17 18 (Dec. 2011), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAhmpacton
InternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf [hereinafter IBT Report].
134. See Tarullo, supra note 15, at 689 90.
135. See H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?,
26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 239 (2001). Formally, the prosecutions of foreign
corporations under the FCPA are not "extraterritorial" because they are based on the
presence of the corporation in the United States. However, they involve actions that occur
primarily abroad and actors that are located primarily abroad, and thus their effects are
extraterritorial. See Minodora D. Vancea, Exporting U.S. Corporate Governance Standards
Through the Sarhanes-Oxley Act: Unilateralism or Cooperation?, 53 DUKE L.J. 833, 833
(2003) (defining extraterritorial jurisdiction as the regulation of activities "where (1) the
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Thus, the FCPA's jurisdictional reach is wide and attaches to many
foreign corporations. Just as importantly, the United States has in-
creasingly used these broad jurisdictional provisions to aggressively
prosecute foreign corporations for foreign bribery, even when the
bribery has little or no tie to the United States. 136
This facet of the FCPA has been largely overlooked in exist-
ing literature, and it fundamentally changes the strategic situation of
the actors in the system. This section develops a revised model of the
international anti-corruption regime incorporating the extraterritorial-
ity feature of the FCPA. Under this model, contrary to the standard
account, the FCPA acts as a unilateral enforcement mechanism for
international corporate bribery norms.
A. Extraterritorial Reach of the FCPA
The U.S. capacity to regulate international corporate bribery
unilaterally depends crucially on the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law. If corporations could easily evade U.S. laws by moving
their conduct offshore, then the FCPA might well have a limited ef-
fect on overall bribery rates. In order to avoid this dynamic, U.S.
regulators have attempted to extend the FCPA's prohibitions to cor-
porations operating abroad. But extraterritorial enforcement of the
FCPA against foreign corporations is limited by restrictions imposed
under both international and domestic law. By examining the extra-
territorial application of the FCPA, this section will demonstrate the
long reach of U.S. law and the consequent constraints faced by for-
eign corporations.
1. Bases of Jurisdiction Under International Law
Under customary international law, states may exercise legis-
lative jurisdiction under either territoriality-based or nationality-
conduct at issue occurs within the U.S., but its effects take place abroad; (2) the conduct
occurs abroad, but its effects take place in the U.S.; or (3) both the conduct and its effects
occur abroad"). These kinds of assertions of jurisdiction have, thus, been referred to as
"extraterritorial territoriality." See Chris Brummer, Territoriality as a Regulatory
Technique: NotesIi-on the Financial Crisis, 79 U. CTN. L. REV. 499, 504 06 (2010).
136. See Garrett, supra note 17, at 1800. One might contrast this state of affairs with
the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison, which significantly cut back on the
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
130 S.Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
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based grounds. 137 It is widely accepted that a state, under territorial
jurisdiction, may regulate events taking place in or persons located in
its own territory. 138 The full extent of territorial jurisdiction, includ-
ing the question of whether a state may regulate acts taking place
outside its territory but causing effects inside its territory, is debated,
but the basic elements of territoriality are well-established and serve
as the primary basis for jurisdiction in international law. 139 National-
ity-based jurisdiction, on the other hand, gives a state the power to
regulate the activity of its own citizens abroad. 140 Even if a prohibit-
ed action occurs in another state's territory, a state may prohibit the
action if it was perpetrated by a citizen. 141 Another important basis
for jurisdiction is the "passive personality" principle, under which a
state may exercise jurisdiction over extraterritorial actions that affect
137. Territorial jurisdiction and nationality jurisdiction are the most widely used bases
for prescriptive jurisdiction. Other forms of jurisdiction include universal jurisdiction,
passive personality jurisdiction, and protective principle jurisdiction. See John H. Knox, A
Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 351, 355-61 (2010). But
see S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 19 (Sept. 7) (suggesting
that states need no jurisdictional basis for legislative jurisdiction and that, in the absence of
explicit limits, they may extend their jurisdiction to any acts anywhere). Universal
jurisdiction refers to a state's power to prosecute certain crimes of universal concern
wherever they occur. Examples include piracy, the slave trade and the hijacking of
airplanes. Although universal jurisdiction is a powerful prosecutorial tool, it is limited to
certain specified offenses and judges are reluctant to extend it to new ones. See Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, in UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (Stephan Macedo, ed., 2004). My focus here will be on
prescriptive jurisdiction, that is, the state's power to make its law applicable to particular
persons, not enforcement jurisdiction, which refers to the state's power to enforce its laws.
Enforcement jurisdiction may also be problematic when prosecuting foreign corporations
because foreign corporations may not have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum
state to justify in personam jurisdiction. See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblow er Suits to Overseas
Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 447 (2009).
138. See INT'L BAR ASS'N, Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 11
(2009), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid ECF39839-A217-4B
3D-8106-DAB716B34F1E [hereinafter IBA Report] ("The starting point for jurisdiction is
that all states have competence over events occurring and persons . . . present in their
territory. This principle, known as the 'principle of territoriality,' is the most common and
least controversial basis for jurisdiction.").
139. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 143, at 485 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); IBA Report, supra note 138, at 12.
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their nationals. 142 The most common example of this basis for extra-
territorial jurisdiction is in response to terrorist acts abroad injuring
or killing a state's citizens. 143
Customary international law places certain limits on a state's
ability to exercise jurisdiction. As the Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law states, "a state may not exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections
with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreason-
able." 144 Whether an exercise of jurisdiction is "reasonable" de-
pends on a number of factors, including the link of the activity to the
territory of the regulating state, the connections between the regulat-
ing state and the person responsible for the regulated activity, the
character of the activity to be regulated and the interest of other states
in the activity. 145
2. Statutory Basis for Extraterritoriality Under the FCPA
The FCPA asserts jurisdiction over corporations based both
142. Id., § 402 cmt. G. See also IBA Report, supra note 138, at 146-49 (describing the
controversial nature of the passive personality principle).
143. See Vaughan Lowe, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 351 (Malcolm D. Evans
ed., 2006).
144. RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 403(1).
145. The Restatement lists eight factors:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the ex-
tent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, di-
rect, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, be-
tween the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity
to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is de-
signed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accept-
ed;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. at § 403(2).
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on territoriality and nationality: if any portion of a prohibited trans-
action takes place in the United States or if any participant in a pro-
hibited transaction is a U.S. resident, then the U.S. government has
jurisdiction to prosecute. 146 Originally, the statutory language ap-
plied the Act only to (i) issuers and (ii) domestic concerns. 147 An "is-
suer" is defined as a company that has registered securities or that is
required to file reports with the SEC. 148 A "domestic concern" is de-
fined as a "citizen, national, or resident of the United States" and
"any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship
which has its principal place of business in the United States, or
which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States." 149 The
FCPA's jurisdictional reach was broadened in 1998 in order to com-
ply with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which directed signa-
tories to "take such measures as may be necessary to establish its ju-
risdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the
offense is committed in whole or in part in its territory." 150 Thus, the
FCPA now also applies to a third category: any person, including
foreign persons, if an act in furtherance of the violation is committed
in the United States. 151
146. See Brown, supra note 135, at 278 79.
147. See id. at 258 59.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2006).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A) (B).
150. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 92, art. 4.
151. Section 78dd-3(a) provides that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person other than an issuer that is subject to sec-
tion 78dd-I of this title or a domestic concern (as defined in section 78dd-2 of
this title), or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such person or any
stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such person, while in the territory of the
United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any means or instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of an offer,
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or of-
fer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to
[a foreign official] . . . in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.
The "act in furtherance" requirement is quite minimal. A sufficient nexus between the
prohibited activity and the United States can be established from the use of the mails or
means of interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). The "means of interstate
commerce" can include travel within the country, the inter-bank clearance of checks, or the
use of interstate telecommunications. See Brown, supra note 135, at 303-17. Given that
much of the world's internet and phone traffic is routed through the United States, many
transactions fall within these definitions. See Ryan Singel, NSA's Lucky Break: Hoi the
U.S. Became Switchboard to the World, WIRED (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.wired.com/
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The FCPA's assertion of jurisdiction over foreign nationals
has been controversial, even within the United States. In 1977, when
Congress was drafting the FCPA, one major issue was whether the
Act should apply to foreign entities owned or controlled by U.S. cor-
porations. 152 Legislators were aware that international bribes had
been financed through offshore entities and foreign subsidiaries, but
they also harbored concerns about the implications of extending the
FCPA's prohibitions to foreign companies.153 The original House
bill applied the Act to foreign subsidiaries, but the Senate bill did
not.154 Eventually, the Senate bill won out, after legislators recog-
nized the "inherent jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic diffi-
culties raised by the inclusion of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. compa-
nies in the direct prohibitions of the bill." 155 It should be noted,
however, that the FCPA contains broad third-party payment provi-
sions, under which liability may attach to domestic parent companies
if they transfer funds to a foreign subsidiary "while knowing that all
or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or
promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official." 156 Indeed,
many FCPA enforcement actions are based on payments to third par-
ties abroad who themselves engage in the prohibited bribery. 157
The FCPA arguably extends its jurisdictional reach to the full
extent permitted under customary international law. 158 Under the na-
tionality principle, if a U.S. national or a U.S.-based corporation
bribes a foreign official anywhere in the world, the FCPA asserts ju-
risdiction over the transaction. 159 Similarly, under the territoriality
principle, if a foreign national or foreign-based corporation bribes a
politics/security/news/2007/10/domestic taps. The broad reach of this provision was
intentional. The House Report on the 1998 Amendments stated that "the territorial basis for
jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the
bribery act is not required." H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 22 (1998).
152. See Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Priorities in
Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong. 91 (1976) (statement of Ralph Nader,
Consumer Advocate).
153. See id.
154. See Brown, supra note 135, at 292.
155. H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 13-14 (1977).
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 dd-l(a)(3), 78 dd-2(a)(3).
157. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Schering-Plough Corp., Litigation Release No.
18740, 82 S.E.C. Docket No. 3732 (June 9, 2004) (holding Schering-Plough, a U.S.
company, liable for a bribe paid by its Polish subsidiary to a Polish governmental official).
158. See Gantz, supra note 72, at 466.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.
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foreign official anywhere in the world, and any act in furtherance of
the violation takes place in the United States, the FCPA asserts juris-
diction over the transaction. 160 The nexus requirement is truly mini-
mal: a "telephone call to the United States, a letter mailed to the
United States, the use of air or road travel, or the clearing of a check
or wire transfer of funds through a financial institution in the United
States" are sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 161 Some scholars have
even asserted that the FCPA's jurisdictional provisions go beyond the
limits permitted by international law. 162
Thus, despite the assertions of some scholars that the FCPA is
distinguished from other bribery regulations by the fact that "interna-
tional competitors are not subject to the FCPA regulation," 163 the
FCPA in fact applies broadly to foreign nationals as long as some
minimal nexus to the United States exists. 164 Of course, the statutory
reach of the FCPA might be less important than how (and where) it is
enforced in practice. The following section will discuss the practice
of the SEC and DOJ in enforcing the FCPA extraterritorially.
3. Extraterritorial Enforcement Practices of the United States
In recent years, the United States has ramped up its extraterri-
torial enforcement of the FCPA against foreign corporations. 165 In
160. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
161. See Brown, supra note 135, at 359.
162. Id. at 320 21.
163. See Beck, Maher & Tschoegl, supra note 125, at 296. They note that "[s]ince
other countries do not penalize their own finns for paying bribes internationally, the anti-
bribery regulation does not apply uniformly to all bribe payers and, thus, could affect U.S.
firms' relative profitability and bribepaying abilities." Id.
164. It should be noted that the U.K. Anti-Bribery Act also has strong extraterritorial
provisions. However, the U.K.'s Justice Ministry has issued guidance stating that "the
Government would not expect .. .the mere fact that a company's securities have been
admitted to the UK Listing Authority's Official List and therefore admitted to trading on the
London Stock Exchange, in itself, to qualify that company as carrying on a business or part
of a business in the UK," and therefore falling within the scope of the Act. Guidance fi)r
Bribery Act 2010, U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 15 16 (Mar. 2011), http://www.justice.gov.
uk/guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. For a table illustrating the various
extraterritorial provisions of international anti-corruption laws, see T. Markus Funk & M.
Bridget Minder, The FCPA in 2011 and Beyond: Is Targeted FCPA Relbrm Really the
"Wrong Thing at the Wrong Time "?, BLOOMBERG L. REP. 7, Dec. 29, 2011.
165. In 2010, the SEC created a specialized FCPA Unit in order to increase its ability to
initiate and conduct FCPA investigations, and increasing resources are devoted to the unit.
See Roger M. Witten et al., Anti-Corruption Enfbrcement Developments: 2010 Year in
Review and 2011 Preview, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2011 63, 65 (PLI Corp.
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what appears to be an intentional decision by the DOJ and the SEC to
rein in non-U.S. companies, the United States has brought a number
of high-profile cases against large foreign companies. As Assistant
Attorney General Alice Fisher stated in 2006, the DOJ was "working
in the context of the OECD Convention to ensure that the major for-
eign competitors to U.S. companies are subject to the same stringent
rules-and the same penalties for violating those rules-as U.S.
companies." 166 The extraterritorial enforcement of the FCPA goes
hand in hand with a broader trend of global corporate prosecutions by
U.S. authorities. 167
The impact of the FCPA on foreign corporations is undenia-
ble. Foreign corporations account for many of the largest FCPA set-
tlements in history. Non-U.S. companies have paid nine of the ten
largest DOJ/SEC settlements by combined civil and criminal fine
amount. 168 The largest fine in history, an $800 million settlement
with the DOJ and the SEC, was paid by Siemens, a German compa-
ny. 169 In 2010, non-U.S. corporations accounted for 94% of the total
penalties paid by corporations for FCPA violations. 170 In 2011, for-
L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. B-1883, 2011). The DOJ also devotes significant
resources to FCPA investigations, which are conducted by the Fraud Section of the
department. In 2010, the DOJ's foreign corruption unit collected almost half of the entire
Criminal Division's $2 billion in penalties. See Christopher M. Matthews & Joe Palazzolo,
Jury Clears Two Businessmen in "Sting" Case on Bribery, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2012, at
B3.
166. Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the
American Bar Association National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Oct. 16,
2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/speech/2006/l0-16-06AAGFCPA
Speech.pdf.
167. See Brown, supra note 135.
168. The largest settlements are: (1) Siemens (Germany) ($800 million); (2)
KBR!Halliburton (U.S.) ($579 million); (3) BAE Systems (U.K.) ($400 million); (4)
Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V./ENI S.p.A. (Holland/Italy) ($365 million); (5) Technip S.A.
(France) ($338 million); (6) JGC Corporation (Japan) ($218.8 million); (7) Daimler AG
(Germany) ($185 million); (8) Alcatel-Lucent S.A. (France) ($137 million); (9) Magyar
Telekom/Deutsche Telekom (Hungary/Germany) ($95 million); and (10) Panalpina
(Switzerland) ($81.8 million). See Richard L. Cassin, Who Will Crack The Top Ten?, THE
FCPA BLOG (Aug. 3, 2012, 11:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/8/3/who-will-
crack-the-top-ten.html.
169. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead
Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/
December/08-cnn-1 105.htnl; Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission Charges
Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-294.htn.
170. See FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign
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eign corporations and individuals paid $458 million of the $504 mil-
lion in total fines collected by the DOJ in FCPA enforcement ac-
tions. 171 In addition, it appears that foreign firms tend to pay higher
fines than comparable domestic firms in criminal prosecutions.
172
One study has found that foreign firms receive fines that are on aver-
age twenty-two times larger than the fines of domestic firms. 173
Furthermore, the SEC and the DOJ are using the broad juris-
dictional provisions of the FCPA to reach transactions that have only
minimal contacts with the United States. A recent enforcement ac-
tion by the SEC and the DOJ demonstrates the aggressively extrater-
ritorial reach of the United States's anti-corruption regulation. In
2011, JGC Corp., a Japanese engineering company, agreed to pay a
$218.8 million fine for bribing Nigerian government officials in order
to obtain construction contracts for liquefied natural gas facilities on
Bonny Island near the Niger Delta. 174 The contracts were estimated
to be worth $6 billion. 175 JGC used sophisticated deal tactics to con-
ceal the payments, including the use of a joint venture, independent
consultants and offshore intermediary companies. 176 The DOJ as-
serted jurisdiction over JGC, an entity that was neither a U.S. domes-
tic concern nor an issuer, based partially on the fact that JGC aided
and abetted its partner in causing U.S. dollar-denominated wire trans-
fers to pass from an account in Amsterdam to an account in Switzer-
Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP,
(Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA-Digest-Jan-201 .pdf.
171. See DOJ En/orcement of the FCPA Year in Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 11,
2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-in-review-2.
172. See Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign A/fftirs and Enfbrcement o/ the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, (NYU Sch. of Law Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 12-35, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfin?abstract id=2116487.
173. See Garrett, supra note 17, at 1780. These findings raise the question of whether
U.S. laws are being enforced against foreign corporations in an even-handed manner. These
are precisely the kinds of worries that have dominated discussions of unilateralism in
antitrust and trade law. See Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the
False Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 383, 395-97 (2007); Guillermo A. Alvarez &
William W. Park, The Neiw Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J.
INT'L L. 365, 369 (2003).
174. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Justice, Office of Public Affairs, JGC Corporation
Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $218.8 Million
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land via correspondent bank accounts in New York. 177 In essence,
the corrupt payments cleared through U.S. banks before reaching
their final destination. This jurisdictional basis was strikingly mini-
mal, and JGC initially challenged it. When JGC eventually decided
to cooperate with the DOJ, the DOJ reduced JGC's cooperation cred-
it due to its jurisdictional objections. 178 To be sure, the trend of bas-
ing jurisdiction on the clearing of transactions through correspondent
bank accounts is not formally "extraterritorial," as the predicate act
is deemed to have occurred within the territory of the United States.
The key point, though, is that the vast majority of the actions took
place outside the United States and all the participants were non-U.S.
companies, calling into question the United States's basis for juris-
diction under customary international law.
Another well-known example of the FCPA's enforcement
against foreign corporations involves BAE Systems, the British mili-
tary contractor. 179 As mentioned above, in 2010, BAE paid $400
million in criminal fines to the United States for its failure to disclose
hundreds of millions of dollars in commission payments it made to
foreign officials in order to secure arms sales. 180 Among other
things, it was alleged that BAE provided high-ranking Saudi officials
with chartered aircraft, luxury limousines, exotic vacations and the
resolution of Saudi officials' gambling debts in return for an $85 bil-
lion fighter jet contract. 181 BAE set up elaborate payment systems
using shell companies and Swiss bank accounts to avoid detection by
177. See Complaint 22, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 11-CR-260, (S.D. Tex. Apr.
6,2011).
178. See Palmina M. Fava, Strategies ./r Staying in Compliance with the FCPA and
Other International Anti-Corruption Laws, ASPATORE (Dec. 2011), 2011 WL 6740780. In
another important case in 2010, Alcatel-Lucent, a French telecommunications company,
settled charges by the SEC and DOJ for violations of the FCPA by paying $137 million in
fines. Alcatel-Lucent had used local consultants to pay bribes to Costa Rican and Honduran
government officials in exchange for telecommunications contracts. Although Alcatel-
Lucent was an "issuer" because it had ADRs trading on the New York Stock Exchange until
2006, its foreign subsidiaries were not. The DOJ asserted jurisdiction over the foreign
subsidiaries by citing meetings, e-mails and phone calls with individuals in Miami, Florida,
along with wire payments routed through U.S. correspondent accounts. See Plea Agreement
111 84-170, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, Case No. 10-CR-20906, (S.D. Fla. Dec.
27, 2010).
179. See Leigh & Evans, supra note 2.
180. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, BAE Systems PLC
Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/lO-crm-209.html [hereinafter, BAE Press
Release].
181. See Sue Reisinger, Mission Critical, in CORPORATE COUNSEL 90 (Dec. 1, 2008).
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the authorities. 182 The United States prosecuted BAE despite the fact
that BAE was not a U.S. corporation, 83 its stock was not listed on a
U.S. exchange and the majority of the questionable payments were
made outside the United States. 184 The DOJ rested its claim of juris-
diction primarily on the fact that BAE had previously made undertak-
ings to the U.S. Department of Defense that it would comply with the
FCPA. 18
5
These examples illustrate just how aggressively the U.S. gov-
ernment has enforced the FCPA against foreign corporations. Many
of the largest FCPA fines in history have been paid by foreign corpo-
rations, and the suspect transactions have often had minimal ties to
the United States. Thus, despite assertions by some commenters that
the FCPA does not apply, or applies in only limited circumstances, to
foreign competitors, extraterritorial enforcement of the FCPA against
foreign corporations appears to be an important part of the U.S. gov-
ernment's international anti-corruption efforts.
B. FCPA as Unilateral Enforcement Mechanism
The broad jurisdictional reach of the FCPA and its extraterri-
torial enforcement by the SEC and the DOJ may require some chang-
es in the way that we understand international anti-corruption efforts.
The standard account views international corporate bribery as a kind
of large-n prisoners' dilemma. 186 Together, countries have an inter-
est in cooperating to prevent corporations from bribing government
officials, but separately, each country has an incentive to cheat and
give its corporations the advantages that bribes can entail. The U.S.
passage of the FCPA was, in a certain sense, a cooperative move by
the United States, demonstrating to other countries that it would pro-
182. See Amy Wilson & Lawrie Holmes, BAE Still Advised by Architect of
Controversial Saudi Tornados Deal, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 7, 2010, at 1.
183. Although BAE Systems PLC has a U.S. subsidiary, BAE Systems Inc., none of the
criminal conduct involved the actions of the subsidiary. See BAE Press Release, supra note
180.
184. The one exception appears to be "substantial benefits" given to "one [Saudi]
official . . .through various payment mechanisms both in the territorial jurisdiction of the
U.S. and elsewhere." Information 1 43, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 10-CR-00035
(D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter BAE Complaint]. See also Steven A. Tyrrell, DOJ
Prosecution of BAE Heralds Continued Aggressive FCPA Enforcement Environment (Feb.
8, 2010), http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=9725.
185. See BAE Complaint, supra note 184, 13.
186. For a more complete explanation of how a large-n prisoners' dilemma might
function, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 3-5 (1990).
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hibit its corporations from bribing. This cooperative move, however,
was not reciprocated by other countries, as they cheated and contin-
ued to allow their corporations to bribe foreign officials. By raising
the cost of bribery for U.S. companies, the conventional story goes,
the FCPA disadvantaged American corporations with respect to their
foreign competitors. In effect, the FCPA created a unilateral dis-
armament game in which foreign corporations and government had
strong incentives to engage in or tacitly allow bribery. 187
This story relies on the assumption that the FCPA does not
apply to foreign corporations, an assumption that has now been am-
ply disproved. The United States has shown the ability and the will
to prosecute foreign corporations for bribery, even when the bribery
takes place in other countries and has minimal ties to the United
States. 188 Thus, the standard theory is mistaken when it describes in-
ternational corruption as a prisoners' dilemma. The United States in
fact has the ability to prevent bribery by corporations from other
countries, or at least raise the costs of engaging in it.
The standard unilateral disarmament account of the FCPA is
flawed, as it fails to take into account the effect of the FCPA on for-
eign corporations. Through strong extraterritorial enforcement ef-
forts, the United States is able to achieve the benefits of cooperation
without requiring any cooperation at all from foreign governments.
This model replicates the payoffs of global cooperation, but it is ac-
complished without international agreement. The United States,
through extraterritorial measures, can impose costs on non-U.S.
companies that bribe foreign officials. In effect, the United States is
providing the public good of anti-bribery regulation unilaterally
through the FCPA.
The United States's ability to regulate international corporate
bribery through unilateral action depends to a great extent on its abil-
ity to impose costs on foreign corporations. If prosecutors cannot as-
sert jurisdiction over a foreign company or its actions, they will find
it difficult to change the payoff structure for those companies. In this
context, the United States possesses a unique ability to regulate the
actions of non-U.S. companies. Many multinational companies have
ties to U.S. financial markets, either by listing stock or ADRs on the
New York Stock Exchange, or by using U.S. financial institutions for
payment services. 189 Few countries have such comprehensive market
187. See Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally
Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 689, 689 (2000).
188. See supra Section III.A.
189. In 2001, the domestic market capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange and
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power. 190 The United States, thus, can force other countries and their
corporations not to cheat by conditioning market access on compli-
ance with the FCPA. The FCPA, then, serves as a sort of interna-
tional enforcement mechanism, but one that is enforced unilaterally
without the requirement of global cooperation. 191
This understanding of the FCPA as a unilateral international
enforcement mechanism helps explain some of the puzzles that mod-
em corruption theory has struggled with in recent years. First, it goes
some way to explaining why economists who have studied the prob-
lem have not consistently found a negative impact of the FCPA on
U.S. business. 192 If the FCPA had been enforced solely against U.S.
businesses, then empirical studies would likely have been more clear-
cut. 193 Assuming that the ability to bribe is an advantage to a corpo-
ration, and that foreign corporations are reasonably competitive with
U.S. corporations, then the prohibition of bribery by U.S. companies
should have diverted some international business to foreign compa-
nies. But if the U.S. government enforces, or threatens to enforce,
the FCPA's prohibitions on foreign corporations, then the competi-
NASDAQ constituted more than half of the capitalization of the entire World Federation of
Exchanges, and the U.S. share of the value of global stock trading was 58%. See COMM. ON
CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, U.S. Competitiveness Measures, http://www.capmktsreg.org/
competitiveness/category-IV.html. In 2005, there were 2,087 foreign firms with cross-
listings in the United States, and foreign listings on the three major exchanges in New York
accounted for 30% of total global foreign listings. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi &
Ren& M. Stulz, Has New York Become Less Competitive Than London in Global Markets?
Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices Over Time, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 253 77 (2009). U.S.
banks account for almost 40% of all global SWIFT traffic for international payments. BANK
FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICS ON PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN
THE CPSS COUNTRIES: FIGURES FOR 2010, at 405, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
cpss99.pdf.
190. The preeminence of U.S. capital markets is, however, on the wane. The
competitiveness of U.S. stock exchanges is falling on a number of metrics. See COMM. ON
CAPITAL MKTs. REGULATION, The Competitive Position of the U.S. Public Equity Market I
(2007), http://capmktsreg.org/2007/ 12/the-competitiveness-position-of-the-u-s-public-equity
-market/.
191. Although, of course, international cooperation is helpful in FCPA prosecutions.
Indeed, there seems to be a growing trend toward cross-border cooperation in international
bribery prosecutions. See Lawrence S. Makow, Current Perspectives and Recommendations
Regarding Governance, Compliance and Ethics in a Time of Change-The Role and
Responsibility of Counsel, in A GUIDE TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2011: NAVIGATING THE
NEW LANDSCAPE 1067, 1126-27 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. 28327,
2011).
192. See Graham, supra note 125; Beck, Maher & Tschoegl, supra note 125; Hines,
supra note 125.
193. Instead, empirical studies have been mixed. See supra note 125.
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tive advantage of being located abroad might disappear. U.S. corpo-
rations and their competitors would face the same competitive con-
straints, and foreign governments might not shift business away from
U.S. companies.
Second, the extraterritorial enforcement of the FCPA explains
why we have not seen a decline in U.S. prosecutions as a response to
lackadaisical anti-bribery enforcement by foreign governments.
Many scholars have noted that other countries have failed fully to
implement or enforce their anti-bribery laws even after OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention's conclusion, 194 but few have explained the U.S.
response to this non-enforcement by other signatories. 195 The United
States has ramped up, not scaled down, its enforcement of the FCPA,
at the same time that its treaty partners remain stubbornly non-
compliant with, or at least not similarly committed to, the Anti-
Bribery Convention. But the active enforcement of the FCPA is par-
tially explained by its extraterritorial reach. Aggressive prosecutions
of foreign corporations are especially important when other countries
are failing to investigate their own companies. Absent some credible
threat of prosecution for paying bribes, foreign corporations may be
unwilling to change their ways and implement robust compliance
programs to prevent bribery in other countries. If their home coun-
tries have proved unable to provide this credible threat, then it may
be necessary for the United States to step in and provide it. And in
some respects, aggressive U.S. enforcement of the FCPA against for-
eign corporations is a welcome and even expected development. One
of the stated purposes of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was to
"ensure that companies face substantially similar rules and penalties
for international bribery, no matter what their own country of origin,
and that the network of laws forged by the combined effort will per-
mit effective enforcement and mutual legal assistance." 196 In order
to fulfill these purposes, the treaty explicitly encouraged countries to
194. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 309; Tarullo, supra note 15, at 680-90.
195. One survey of employees of European companies found that 68% of respondents
believed that their regulators were either unwilling to pursue convictions for bribery and
corruption offenses or were ineffective in doing so. Ernst and Young LLP, European Fraud
Survey 2011: Recovery, Regulation and Integrity, 3, http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/
Assurance/Fraud-Investigation---Dispute-Services/European-fraud-survey-20 11 --recovery--
regulation-and-integrity.
196. Review of the 1994 Recommendation on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, Including Proposals to Facilitate the Criminalization of Bribery of Foreign
Officials, OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises
(CIME) to the OECD Council at the Ministerial Level, § IlIA (May 26, 1997), cited in
Brown, supra note 135, at 266-67.
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assert broad jurisdictional powers over foreign bribes. 197 The United
States has escalated FCPA prosecutions in large part by escalating
prosecutions of foreign corporations, and this enforcement may well
be a response to the lack of enforcement by other countries. 198
C. The Anti-Competitive Effect of the FCPA?
Extraterritorial enforcement of the FCPA mitigates one of the
central concerns of scholars, legislators and corporate executives:
that the FCPA puts U.S. corporations at a competitive disadvantage
with respect to foreign corporations. 199 Many scholars have argued
that the FCPA distorts international competition by imposing com-
petitive constraints on U.S. companies that it does not impose on for-
eign companies.200 This argument relies on the faulty premise that
the FCPA's provisions apply only to U.S. corporations, and not for-
eign ones. As described in the previous section, not only has the
FCPA granted broad extraterritorial jurisdiction to the SEC and the
DOJ to prosecute foreign corporations for bribery, the SEC and the
DOJ have in fact used this jurisdiction to impose hefty fines on for-
eign corporations.
20'
The FCPA has led to significant changes in the way that for-
eign corporations do business. Foreign corporations have devoted
increasing amounts of resources and attention to complying with the
FCPA, and many multinational corporations have adopted anti-
corruption compliance programs. 20 2 As a result of FCPA settlements,
several large foreign corporations have retained independent compli-
ance monitors who evaluate and oversee internal ethics and compli-
ance programs.20 3 Surveys have shown a growing sense in the pri-
197. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 92, art. 4.
198. See Developments in the LaIw-Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1285-
89(2011).
199. See supra note 93.
200. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 307; Tarullo, supra note 15, at 667.
201. See supra Section I1I.A-B.
202. See Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer & Negar Katirai, Enfi)rcement (?fthe FCPA
in the United States: Trends and Eflects qf International Standards, in THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2008: COPING WITH HEIGHTENED ENFORCEMENT RISKS 711, 716
(PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. 13908, 2008). For an example of a
multinational corporation's anti-corruption compliance program, see Statoil, Anti-
Corruption Compliance Program, available at http://www.statoil.com/no/About/Ethics
Values/Downloads/Anti-corruption%/"20compliance%/o20programn .pdf.
203. See Witten et al., supra note 165, at 78 79; F. Joseph Wain, Michael S. Diamant &
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vate sector abroad that corruption is bad for business. 20 4 Many for-
eign businesses are now in support of greater anti-corruption supervi-
sion by governments. 20 5 Foreign corporations have been forced to
pay large fines to the U.S. government, and U.S. investigations of
foreign companies have instigated home-country prosecution as
well. 2
06
Extraterritorial enforcement of the FCPA, then, should help to
blunt the longstanding criticism of the Act as "anti-American.
' 20 7
By imposing the FCPA's disciplines on foreign corporations in a rig-
orous way, the United States has reduced the competitive disad-
vantage that domestic corporations might otherwise have faced under
domestic legislation prohibiting international bribery. The FCPA
raises the cost of bribery to both U.S. and foreign corporations, and
thus imposes similar (if not identical) competitive constraints on both
groups.
Of course, one might respond that, true, the FCPA hits many
foreign corporations, but it also does not hit many other foreign cor-
porations. The FCPA only reaches foreign corporations that either
have equity securities trading on a U.S. exchange or commit acts in
furtherance of a bribe within the United States. In practice, this has
meant the FCPA's reach is limited to large corporations with multi-
national operations. 20 8 Thus, its effect on foreign business is not
Veronica S. Root, Somebody's Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and HoIw They Can Work
Better, 13 PENN. J. BuS. L. 321 (2011).
204. European Fraud Survey 2011: Recovery, Regulation and Integrity, ERNST &
YOUNG LLP (2011), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Assurance/Fraud-Investigation---
Dispute-Services/European-fraud-survey-20 11--recovery--regulation-and-integrity (finding
that two-thirds of respondents at European companies believed that having a strong
reputation for ethical behavior was a commercial advantage for companies).
205. Id.
206. See Bruce E. Yannett & David M. Fuhr, Juggling Criminal, Civil and
Multinational Investigations, in 43RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 505,
528 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. B-1918, 2011).
207. There is an alternative argument that robust anti-corruption laws may actually be
good for businesses subject to them. The existence of the FCPA allows U.S. companies to
credibly commit to open and honest business practices. This commitment might shelter
subject corporations from unnecessary demands for bribes from foreign officials. Scholars
have found some empirical evidence to support this view. One study found that finrs that
pay more bribes also face more bureaucratic intrusion, in effect, red tape. See Daniel
Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?,
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7093, 1999), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7093.
208. See Garrett, supra note 17, at 1780 ("Convicted foreign firms are also
disproportionately public firms and large firms.").
[51:360
INTERNA TIONAL CORPORATE BRIBERY
equivalent to its effect on domestic business.
This observation is certainly accurate: the FCPA does not,
and cannot, reach every foreign corporation, and there are many
businesses that engage in bribery that the United States has no chance
of prosecuting. Customary international law and U.S. constitutional
law establish limits on what kinds of acts the United States may crim-
inalize and what kinds of persons the United States may prosecute. 2
0 9
The assertion of this Article, though, is that that the FCPA's extrater-
ritorial enforcement lessens anti-competitive concerns, not that it
eliminates them. By enforcing the FCPA against foreign corpora-
tions, we impose some of the competitive constraints that U.S. corpo-
rations face on their foreign competitors as well. This should raise
the cost of bribery for foreign corporations-they too now face the
risk of prosecution and added compliance costs-even if it does not
raise the cost as high as it raises the cost for U.S. companies. As long
as the payoffs from bribery are sufficiently low, foreign corporations
may cease to engage in it.
Moreover, while it is true that the FCPA is principally en-
forced against foreign companies that are large and that have multi-
national operations, so too is the FCPA principally enforced against
domestic corporations that are large and that have multinational oper-
ations. 210 And these domestic corporations are largely competing
against other multinational corporations, precisely the subset of ac-
tors that are most likely to have ties to the United States. 211 Thus, the
FCPA's effect is not nearly as skewed against U.S. companies as
some scholars suggest, since foreign competitors are often subject to
the same restrictions. This dynamic is reinforced by the SEC's use of
so-called "industry sweeps," in which the SEC initiates broad, indus-
try-wide probes of international corruption. 2 12  These investiga-
tions-targeting the pharmaceutical industry, the arms industry, the
oil and gas industry and, most recently, the financial services industry
for sovereign wealth funds-look into corrupt practices by U.S. and
209. See Knox, supra note 137; IBA Report, supra note 138; Sarah H. Cleveland,
Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. Riv. 225, 241-
42 (2010).
210. See N. Adele Hogan, SEC Launches FCPA Probe 0! Financial Services Industry's
Interactions With Sovereign Wealth Funds, in UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS
SUMMER 2011 865, 867 68 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. B-1898,
2011).
211. See W. Chan Kim & Peter Hwang, Global Strategy and Multinationals' Entry
Mode Choice, 23 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 29, 32 35 (1992).
212. See Witten et al., supra note 165, at 72-74.
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non-U.S. companies alike. 213 They reduce the concern that U.S.
companies will be disadvantaged by zealous enforcement efforts.
214
One might also ask why so many U.S. corporations complain
about the FCPA if it does not harm them. The FCPA does in fact
impose substantial costs upon U.S. corporations, costs that reduce
corporate profits. 215 It can lead to a number of transaction costs, in-
cluding the implementation of compliance programs, internal audits,
accounting changes and legal costs. 216 But this is not the same as
saying that it puts domestic companies at a disadvantage with respect
to other corporations. As long as it puts equal costs on foreign com-
petitors, it will not create an unequal playing field. One can level the
playing field either by lowering the costs for all equally or by raising
the costs for all equally. But as long as these costs are borne equally
by all players, it will not benefit one at the cost of another.
Finally, there is growing evidence that U.S. corporations are
using the FCPA as an offensive legal weapon against their foreign
competitors. By strategically reporting on violations of the FCPA by
foreign rivals, U.S. companies can impose costs on foreign compa-
nies while simultaneously receiving leniency from U.S. prosecutors.
In a recent case, Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer, Inc., two U.S.-based
pharmaceutical companies, voluntarily disclosed to the DOJ and the
SEC that they had discovered potentially improper payments by its
employees to foreign officials abroad. 217 Johnson & Johnson, for ex-
ample, had paid bribes to Greek doctors who chose the company's
surgical implants as well as to doctors in Poland and Romania in re-
turn for agreements to prescribe the company's drugs. 218 Pfizer
eventually paid around $60 million in fines, and Johnson & Johnson
paid $70 million.219 These amounts, however, represented reduced
fines due to the companies' "substantial assistance in the prosecution
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See IBT Report, supra note 133, at 10 (noting that "for large multinational
companies, the FCPA component of compliance costs is in the high tens of millions of
dollars per year").
216. Id.
217. See Christopher Matthews & Joe Palazzolo, Pfizer Near Settlement on Bribery,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2011, at B1.
218. Id. The doctors at issue worked for government-run hospitals and therefore
constituted "foreign officials" under the FCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f) (2006) (defining
a "foreign official" as "any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof').
219. See Matthews & Palazzolo, supra note 217, at B.
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of others." 220 In other words, Pfizer and Johnson & Johnson volun-
tarily came forward to the U.S. government to disclose their own vio-
lations, but at the same time provided information about violations by
their rivals. This information assisted the U.S. government in
launching investigations of Merck (Germany), Astrazeneca (U.K.)
and GlaxoSmithKline (U.K.). 221 The Pfizer case demonstrates how
U.S. corporations are actively using the FCPA as an offensive tactic
to impose litigation costs on their foreign competitors. 222 The offen-
sive use of the FCPA against foreign competitors could be sharpened
even further by the recently proposed "Foreign Business Bribery
Prohibition Act," which would grant U.S. companies a private right
of action against foreign companies that violate the FCPA. 223
IV. THE PERILS OF UNILATERAL ENFORCEMENT
As the previous section demonstrates, extraterritorial en-
forcement of the FCPA lessens some of the most problematic con-
cerns about the Act's effects on U.S. corporations, just as it helps to
explain some of the puzzles of international corruption theory. At the
same time, unilateral enforcement of corporate bribery regulations
raises different and potentially equally problematic concerns. This
section will focus on three of these concerns: biased enforcement,
over-enforcement and system stability.
A. Biased Enforcement
Extraterritorial enforcement of the FCPA raises the possibility
of biased enforcement by U.S. authorities. Prosecutors may decide to
pursue foreign corporations more than they pursue domestic corpora-
tions in order to give domestic corporations an advantage. They may
require foreign corporations to pay larger fines than domestic corpo-
rations. Both of these possibilities find some support in empirical
studies of FCPA enforcement actions. 224 Biased enforcement might
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Of course, there is nothing to stop foreign companies from coming forward and
informing on their U.S. competitors as well. But this kind of race-to-the-top, whereby each
corporation has an incentive to be the first to confess and rat out its competitors, could be a
powerful tool for global anti-corruption efforts.
223. Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of201 1, H.R. 3531, 112th Cong. (2011).
224. Foreign companies have paid eight of the ten largest FCPA settlements in history.
See Parker, supra note 93, at 390. In criminal prosecutions, foreign companies receive fines
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serve to encourage other countries to enforce actively their own in-
ternational corruption laws, 225 but it might also be used to favor
American corporations. 226 If other countries perceive the United
States to be using the FCPA as an economic tool to harm foreign
competitors, other countries may follow suit and attempt to apply
their own international anti-corruption laws against U.S. corpora-
tions.227 This so-called "boomerang" effect is particularly strong if
the system contains other strong actors capable of resisting unilateral-
ism.
2 2 8
Biased enforcement inverts the unilateral disarmament situa-
tion. In the most extreme case, the FCPA might be enforced solely
against foreign corporations. In this case, foreign corporations would
face steep costs for engaging in bribery, while U.S. corporations
would face none. Biased enforcement of the FCPA would grant U.S.
corporations a competitive advantage in international business. They
would be able to bribe foreign officials and they could be assured that
foreign corporations would refrain from doing so. Lucrative transac-
tions and government contracts would be diverted to U.S. companies
away from equally competitive foreign ones.
Biased enforcement is problematic because it calls into ques-
tion whether the United States is truly providing the public good in
question: corporate bribery regulation. If the FCPA is largely a tool
for imposing costs on foreign companies, then the Act seems much
that are on average twenty-two times larger than the fines of domestic firms. See Garrett,
supra note 17, at 1780.
225. See Developments in the Law Extraterritoriality, supra note 198, at 1288
(arguing that "extraterritorial FCPA enforcement encourages signatories to launch their own
prosecutions in accordance with the OECD Convention"); Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm
Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 87 (2001) (arguing that
unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United States on human rights abusers can
promote norm internalization by "formally provok[ing] numerous interactions between the
United States and foreign governments in which global norms are raised and clarified").
226. Biased enforcement is one of the major worries of hegemonic stability theorists. In
a world of unilateral enforcement, the hegemon may be able to impose a form of "tax" on
other countries for the provision of the good. A charitable interpretation of this imposition
of costs on other countries is that the tax is a tool to help defray the cost of monitoring and
enforcement. But it may also be seen as coercion. See Snidal, supra note 58, at 587-88.
227. The United States has an inherent jurisdictional advantage because many more
companies have minimum contacts with the United States. Thus, the United States can
assert jurisdiction over a wide array of foreign companies, while many other countries do not
have this option.
228. See Nico Krisch, From Consent to Consultation: International Law in an Age of
Global Public Goods (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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less like an altruistic or praiseworthy regulation, and much more like
a power play by the United States. If states perceive the FCPA as a
non-cooperative move by the United States, then they may be less
likely to support and maintain the regime in the future.
229
B. Over-Enforcement
Even if unilateral enforcement of corporate anti-bribery laws
can somehow be accomplished in an even-handed and unbiased
manner, it may lead to over-enforcement of corruption laws. 230 The
worry here is that national regulators, acting alone and without coor-
dination with other national regulators, might deter beneficial corpo-
rate behavior or encourage wasteful corporate behavior. Through
unilateral action, countries could end up creating overlapping, dupli-
cative or even conflicting regulations that create unnecessary costs
for companies operating in international business settings. 231
It is noteworthy that unilateral corporate regulation inverts the
concerns that unilateral disarmament raises. Previously, the worry
was largely about under-regulation. When domestic action against
international corporate bribery was generally understood as unilateral
disarmament, the main concern was that, in the absence of multilat-
eral cooperation, we would have too little regulation of corporate
bribery worldwide. 232 Under this model, no single state acting alone
had sufficient incentive to regulate globally and thus regulation went
lacking. 233
But with unilateral corporate regulation an increasingly
prevalent phenomenon, the concern changes from under-enforcement
to over-enforcement. The United States has demonstrated a strong
willingness to punish foreign companies for bribery abroad. 234 The
U.K. has enacted its own international anti-bribery law with even
229. See Snidal, supra note 58, at 579.
230. There is some dispute in the literature about what precisely over-enforcement
should mean. Some have argued that over-enforcement occurs whenever the total sanction
suffered by the violator of a legal rule exceeds the amount optimal for deterrence. See
Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenfr)rcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1744 (2005).
231. See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883
(2002) (setting forth a system for more efficient regulation of cross-border activity to avoid
these kinds of problems).
232. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 48, at S162; Tarullo, supra note 15, at 675 76;
Brewster, supra note 14, at 303 11; Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 93, at 635.
233. Id.
234. See supra Section ILA-B.
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more stringent provisions. 235 If multiple countries begin to enforce
their bribery laws simultaneously and without coordination, compa-
nies could be subject to overlapping or even conflicting regulations.
Of course, it might be that the optimal level of corruption is zero, and
the multiple punishments doled out for the same crime might merely
serve to ensure that there is no incentive to bribe at all. But corrup-
tion laws also bring along transaction costs, such as reporting re-
quirements and compliance programs. If multiple governments adopt
unilateral corporate regulations without regard to the efforts of other
countries, they may impose unnecessary costs on corporations. Fur-
thermore, if biased enforcement is a reality, then over-enforcement
becomes even more problematic. In response to overzealous en-
forcement by the United States, other states might begin to prosecute
foreign companies for non-problematic behavior for the sole purpose
of benefiting local companies. 236
In some cases, U.S. prosecutions of foreign companies have
in fact conflicted with the decisions of foreign governments. The
United States has prosecuted companies after their home country
governments have completed investigations and reached final settle-
ments, in what appears to be an effort to register dissatisfaction with
the resolution of the matter by home countries, either because the
punishment was insufficient or the investigation was inadequately
thorough.237 Multiple prosecutions create costs for companies that
might be eliminated if regulators worked in a coordinated manner.
If over-enforcement is the worry, it may seem odd that U.S.
companies have often argued that foreign countries should adopt
235. See Victoria Makarova, Anti-Corruption Practices Survey 2011-Cloudy with a
Chance of Prosecution?, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS INSTITUTE 2012, at 559,
564 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. 35502, 2012).
236. Accusations of biased enforcement have recently arisen with regard to sanctions-
dodging by financial institutions. When New York prosecutors unveiled allegations that the
U.K.-based bank Standard Chartered had illegally concealed more than $250 billion of
transactions with Iran, U.K. politicians publicly complained about the "increasingly anti-
British bias" by U.S. regulators, which had "start[ed] to shade into protectionism." See
Max Colchester, Liz Rappaport & Damian Paletta, In U.K., A Backlash Over Standard
Chartered Probe, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2012, 11:19 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 10000872396390443991704577577154126976234.html.
237. The SEC and the DOJ charged Statoil, a Norwegian state-owned oil company, with
bribing an Iranian official in order to obtain oil and gas development contracts, after
Norwegian authorities had fined the company for the same behavior. The Norwegian
settlement required the payment of a small fine and no acknowledgment of wrongdoing. See
Philip Urofsky, It Doesn't Take Much: Expansive Jurisdiction in FCPA Matters, in
CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A AND SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2007, at 619, 626 27
(PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. 19203, 2009).
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FCPA-like corporate bribery laws. In other words, if companies be-
lieve that unilateral bribery regulations will lead to too much regula-
tion, they would likely want fewer, not more, countries to have such
laws. But it appears that the opposite is the case. 238 This fact might
suggest that over-enforcement is not a particularly salient worry with
unilateral bribery regulation, either because the current regime still
generally under-deters bribery or because there are pockets of inter-
national business that remain immune to U.S. prosecution. If the cur-
rent level of deterrence achieved under unilateral regulation is below
the optimal level, companies might favor the spread of bribery laws
to other countries. Furthermore, the harms associated with a slight
level of over-enforcement might be less pronounced than the harms
from under-enforcement. All these factors, thus, could explain why
U.S. companies often argue that foreign countries should adopt
FCPA-like international bribery laws.
239
C. System Stability
A further concern raised by the FCPA's aggressive extraterri-
toriality is that the unilateral approach may not provide a stable solu-
tion to the problem, that is, it may not be sustainable over the long-
term. The continued effectiveness of U.S. anti-corruption regulation
depends on the extraterritorial reach of the FCPA. Jurisdiction, how-
ever, can only extend so far. The dominance of American financial
markets has made it possible for the United States to assert jurisdic-
tion over a wide array of corporations operating in markets around
the world. In the future, however, this may not be the case. There is
increasing evidence that the competitiveness and desirability of U.S.
capital markets have declined in recent years. 240 Part of this decline
is attributable to the increasingly burdensome corporate regulations
applicable to U.S. companies. 241 Companies incorporated in the
238. See Tarullo, supra note 15, at 675.
239. An alternative explanation is that managers at times take positions at odds with the
general interest of the companies that they run, either because of diverging interests or lack
of information. So, managers might publicly espouse the benefits of the spread of corporate
bribery laws to other countries, even if this phenomenon would lead to over-enforcement of
bribery norms and harm their companies. Managers might well pay closer attention to the
domestic effects of bribery norms than the foreign effects. They might also be more attuned
to the obligations of corruption laws than their enforcement patterns.
240. In the 1990s, U.S. IPOs accounted for 26.7% of all global IPOs. Since 2000, that
share has dropped to 11.7%. See IBT Report, supra note 133, at 21.
241. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Benefits of Incorporating Abroad in an Age of
Globalization, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2011, 3:53 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/
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United States are subject to a slew of governance and reporting re-
quirements that impose a significant cost on business. 242 Just as im-
portantly, corporate tax rates in the United States are higher than in
many countries, and these taxes apply to worldwide income, rather
than just income earned within the country. 243 Similarly, the ease of
raising capital abroad has increased. Large pools of capital have ac-
cumulated in foreign markets and investors can more readily invest
abroad today. 244
The enforcement of the FCPA's rigorous anti-bribery and ac-
counting provisions against foreign corporations may exacerbate the
problem by increasing the costs and decreasing the benefits of listing
securities in the United States. In the past, non-U.S. companies in
need of capital infusions might have had little choice about whether
to offer securities in the United States because its markets provided
access to capital in a way that other countries' markets could not.
245
Now, companies in need of capital have a variety of attractive op-
tions beyond the United States. 246 A number of companies, in fact,
have delisted their securities from U.S. stock exchanges to avoid the
high regulatory costs associated with the listing.247 At least four
companies (Siemens, Daimler, Volvo and ABB) delisted their securi-
ties from the New York Stock Exchange shortly after being prosecut-
ed for FCPA violations. 248 While dollar-denominated transactions,
another basis for jurisdiction, remain a powerful source driving pros-
ecutions, their prevalence may also decline in response to FCPA
20/the-benefits-of-incorporating-abroad-in-an-age-of-globalization/.
242. See U.S. Competitiveness Measures, supra note 189.
243. Corporations incorporated within the United States need only pay taxes on their
worldwide income when they repatriate the income into the United States. This has led to a
troublesome situation, where U.S. companies hold an estimated $1.375 trillion in cash
abroad in foreign subsidiaries. See id.
244. See N. Adele Hogan, Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation, in CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A AND SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2007, at
229, 242 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. 10830, 2007).
245. See Luigi Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing its Competitive Edge?,
(ECGI Working Paper No. 192, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id 1028701.
246. Id.
247. Between 2007 and 2011, at least sixty companies have delisted securities from U.S.
exchanges and explained that their reason was the high administrative, regulatory and other
costs. See IBT Report, supra note 133, at 21.
248. See Thomas Gorman & William McGrath, The New Era (?f FCPA Enlbrcement:
Focus on Individuals and Callsfir Relbrn, SEC ACTIONs BLOG (Aug. 31, 2011, 9:00 PM),
http://www.secactions.com/'?p 3570.
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prosecutions. 249
In sum, unilateralism is only feasible for as long as one coun-
try has the power to force foreign actors to comply with its regula-
tions. The United States has long relied on this approach, condition-
ing market access on compliance with regulatory regimes. As
alternative markets arise, the United States may progressively lose its
unilateral power to regulate international corporate bribery, and mul-
tilateral cooperation may become necessary.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that international corporate bribery
scholarship has been sidetracked by a reliance on the prisoners' di-
lemma model of corruption regulation. By focusing on how the
FCPA has disadvantaged U.S. corporations in international business,
the standard account has lost track of the important extraterritorial
dimensions of the FCPA's enforcement. Unilateral enforcement of
international corruption norms resolves many of the problems tradi-
tionally associated with corruption regulation, including worries
about self-imposed costs and the difficulties of achieving multilateral
cooperation. But unilateral enforcement raises a new set of prob-
lems, ones that have not been addressed sufficiently in the scholarly
literature. This Article has attempted to sketch out some of these
new concerns in order to start a larger discussion about the promises
and perils of unilateral regulation.
249. More than 35% of international financial transactions are denominated in dollars.
The use of U.S. dollars in international commerce has greatly expanded the territorial reach
of U.S. law, as most dollar-denominated transactions must "clear" through a U.S. bank. See
Dollar Pover, THE ECONOMIST, June 23, 2012, at 75. While companies can structure their
transactions in other currencies, the United States has used the power of the dollar to affect
financial institutions. For example, in attempting to sanction Iran's oil trade, the United
States. has enacted a law that denies access to the American banking system to any financial
institution that facilitates trades with the Central Bank of Iran. See id.
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